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THE CONTINUING VITALITY OF
RAVIN V. STATE: ALASKANS STILL
HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO POSSESS MARIJUANA IN THE
PRIVACY OF THEIR HOMES
JASON BRANDEIS
INTRODUCTION
Alaska has a unique personal-use marijuana law that has sparked
legal debate for nearly forty years. In 1975, in Ravin v. State,1 the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the Alaska Constitution’s right to privacy
protects an adult’s ability to use and possess a small amount of
marijuana in the home for personal use.2 The Alaska Supreme Court
thereby became the first—and remains the only—state or federal court
to announce a constitutional privacy right that protects some level of
marijuana use and possession.3 With that landmark decision, the court
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1. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
2. See id. at 511. (holding that “possession of marijuana by adults at home
for personal use is constitutionally protected”).
3. Andrew S. Winters, Ravin Revisited: Do Alaskans Still Have a Constitutional
Right to Possess Marijuana in the Privacy of Their Homes?, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 315,
319–20 (1998). Many state courts have declined to follow or have outright
rejected Ravin. See, e.g., State v. Mallan, 950 P.2d 178, 184 (Haw. 1998) (“[T]he
purported right to possess and use marijuana is not a fundamental right and a
compelling state interest is not required.”); Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil
Co., 589 A.2d 170, 176 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (“There is no right in New
Jersey to the private use of controlled dangerous substances by adults in their
homes.”); People v. Shepard, 409 N.E.2d 840, 843 (N.Y. 1980) (per curiam)
(“Nothing would be more inappropriate than for us to prematurely remove
marihuana from the Legislature’s consideration by classifying its personal
possession as a constitutionally protected right.”); State v. Beecraft, No.
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planted the seeds of a jurisprudential philosophy that would grow to
place a primacy on individual privacy rights and would forever wed the
concepts of privacy and marijuana in Alaska constitutional lore.
Now in the fourth decade since Ravin was issued, the legal status of
marijuana4 in Alaska sits in an odd position. Personal use and
possession of marijuana in the privacy of the home remain protected by
Ravin and its progeny, but the current Alaska criminal code prohibits
possession of any amount of marijuana,5 as does the federal Controlled
Substances Act (CSA).6 Despite these statutory bans, Alaska courts
continue to recognize that “not all marijuana possession is a crime in
Alaska.”7 This tension between state court decisions and state and
federal statutes continues to raise questions as to the rights of the
individual, the responsibilities of law enforcement, and the continuing
vitality of the Ravin decision.

2006AP982-CR, 2006 WL 3842171, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2006) (“Beecraft
does not explain why the Alaska court’s construction of that provision would be
relevant in Wisconsin.”). A number of other state and federal courts have held
that there is no privacy interest in marijuana use. E.g., Nat’l Org. for the Reform
of Marijuana Laws v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 123, 132 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that the
prohibition of the possession of marijuana does not infringe an individual’s
constitutionally protected right to privacy under the U.S. Constitution); see also
Winters, supra note 3, at 320 (“[C]ourts in states other than Alaska have
considered whether their state constitutions protect marijuana possession, but
none has come to the same conclusion as Ravin”); Kuromiya v. United States, 37
F. Supp.2d 717, 726–28 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (discussing the rejection of any federal
right to marijuana possession).
4. “Marijuana” is defined by Alaska statute as:
[T]he seeds, and leaves, buds, and flowers of the plant (genus)
Cannabis, whether growing or not; it does not include the resin or oil
extracted from any part of the plants, or any compound, manufacture,
salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation from the resin or oil, including
hashish, hashish oil, and natural or synthetic tetrahydrocannabinol; it
does not include the stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the stalks,
oil or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound,
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the stalks,
fiber, oil or cake, or the sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of
germination.
ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.900(14) (2012).
5. §§ 11.71.040–11.71.060. However, Alaska law provides an affirmative
defense for medical marijuana use that complies with the requirements of the
state medical marijuana act. See § 17.37.030 (“A patient, primary caregiver, or
alternate caregiver registered with the department under this chapter has an
affirmative defense to a criminal prosecution related to marijuana to the extent
provided in AS 11.71.090.”); § 11.71.090 (2010) (A defendant maintains an
affirmative defense so long as the patient was registered under AS 17.37 and the
use complied with the requirements of AS 17.37”).
6. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012).
7. State v. Crocker, 97 P.3d 93, 94 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
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Such confusion is not new or unexpected. In a 1998 Alaska Law
Review note, Andrew S. Winters asked “Do Alaskans still have a
constitutional right to possess marijuana in the privacy of their homes?”8
Winters correctly concluded that Ravin “should be respected as good
law.”9 Much happened since that note was written: Alaska voters
approved a medical marijuana law,10 Alaska courts issued several
opinions concerning personal marijuana use,11 and the state legislature
attempted to recriminalize all marijuana possession,12 resulting in highprofile litigation13 and leaving statutes on the books that run directly
counter to Ravin.14 Additionally, the recent uptick in the number of other
jurisdictions that have passed medical marijuana laws,15 or have
otherwise decriminalized or legalized marijuana,16 has renewed interest

8. See Winters, supra note 3, at 315 (identifying the purpose of the article as
reviewing Ravin and determining whether it remains good law in Alaska).
9. See id. at 316 (stating that the factual premises set out in Ravin “are in
fact still valid and . . . should still be respected as good law.”).
10. Food and Drugs—Medical Use of Marijuana § 4, 1999, Alaska Sess. Laws
Ch. 37, 8–10.
11. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 991 P.2d 799, 803 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999)
(construing Ravin to apply only to small amounts of marijuana and holding that
the legislature could validly prohibit possession of eight ounces of marijuana);
Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 544–45 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003), reh’g denied, 83 P.3d 545
(Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (holding that adults may possess less than four ounces of
marijuana in the home and for personal use); Crocker, 97 P.3d at 98 (holding a
warrant to search a person’s home for evidence of marijuana possession is
inappropriate unless the State’s warrant application establishes probable cause
to believe that the person’s possession of marijuana exceeds the scope of the
possession that is constitutionally protected under Ravin).
12. H.B. 149, 24th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Alaska 2006).
13. See, e.g., State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 373 (Alaska 2009)
(Carpeneti, J., dissenting) (referring to the case as “high-profile”).
14. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060 (2012) (criminalizing the possession of
any amount of marijuana).
15. Eighteen states and the District of Columbia now permit medical
marijuana use. 18 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG,
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881
(last updated Nov. 16, 2012). Six of those medical marijuana laws were enacted
in 2010 or later. Id. Four other states have pending legislation or upcoming ballot
initiatives to legalize medical marijuana. 4 States with Pending Legislation to
Legalize Medical Marijuana, PROCON.ORG, http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org
/view.resource.php?resourceID=002481 (last updated Nov. 7, 2012).
16. In November 2012, voters in Colorado and Washington approved ballot
initiatives legalizing recreational marijuana use in those states. See Jack Healy,
Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal Questions Remain, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2012, at P15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/
politics/marijuana-laws-eased-in-colorado-and-washington.html.
Fourteen
other states and a number of municipalities have decriminalized the possession
of marijuana for non-medical purposes. See Places That Have Decriminalized NonMedical Cannabis In The United States, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Places_that_have_decriminalized_non-medical_cannabis_in_the_United_States
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in the relationship between state laws that permit some marijuana use
and the CSA, which still completely bans it.17 It is therefore time to ask,
and answer, that question again.
This Article seeks to clarify the current status of Alaska law
governing personal use and possession of marijuana and to identify the
future precedential value of Ravin. The Article is broken into four main
parts. Part I briefly chronicles the history and development of Alaska’s
personal-use marijuana law, focusing on major court decisions and key
pieces of legislation involving the intersection of the right of privacy and
marijuana. Part II explains how ripeness, prosecutorial discretion, and
stare decisis combine to insulate Ravin from being easily overturned.
Part III discusses ongoing issues related to administering and
implementing Ravin, including the roles the state courts and legislature
continue to play in defining the scope of personal use of marijuana, the
ability of law enforcement officials to investigate suspected marijuana
grow operations based on the perception of marijuana odor, and the
importance of ensuring objective review of the science underlying
marijuana policy in Alaska. Part IV examines how the rights protected
under Ravin lawfully exist in light of the CSA’s marijuana ban. The
Article concludes that Ravin retains its vitality and should be respected
as good law unless and until the Alaska Supreme Court rules otherwise.

I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF ALASKA’S
PERSONAL-USE MARIJUANA LAW
A.

The 1970s and 1980s: Ravin and the Legislative Response

In August 1972 the Alaska Constitution was amended to include an
explicit right of privacy.18 That December, Irwin Ravin was arrested and
charged with violating an Alaska statue prohibiting possession of
(last modified Nov. 20, 2012).
17. See generally Robert A. Mikos, The Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana
and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421,
1423 (2009) (“I argue that states retain both de jure and de facto power to exempt
medical marijuana from criminal sanctions in spite of Congress’s
uncompromising—and clearly constitutional—ban on the drug.”); Robert A.
Mikos, Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New Approach to Medical
Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 634–35 (2011) (“The question now is
whether the federal government will allow the states to construct a sensible
regulatory regime free of federal interference or whether it will instead wage an
ongoing guerilla-style campaign against medical marijuana—one with many
casualties, but with no real victory possible.”).
18. “The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be
infringed. The legislature shall implement this section.” ALASKA CONST. art. 1, §
22.
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marijuana.19
Ravin challenged the constitutionality of the law, arguing that his
conduct was protected by both the state and federal right of privacy.20
Ravin’s challenge asserted that the available scientific evidence showed
that marijuana was “a relatively innocuous substance” and if marijuana
was not all that harmful, the state could not prove that it had a sufficient
interest in prohibiting its use and possession.21 The Alaska Supreme
Court agreed with him to a certain extent. In Ravin v. State, the court
identified a limited right to possess marijuana within the sphere of the
Alaska Constitution’s broader right to privacy.22 The court held that
“possession of marijuana by adults at home for personal use is
constitutionally protected”23 because the state could not “meet its
substantial burden and show that the proscription of marijuana in the
home is supportable by achievement of a legitimate state interest.”24
The court did not reach this conclusion lightly. The justices pored
through scientific evidence on marijuana use and its health and social
effects and found “no firm evidence that marijuana, as presently used in
this country, is generally a danger to the user or to others.”25 Weighing
“the relative insignificance of marijuana consumption as a health
problem[,]”26 the importance of respecting the sanctity of the home,27
19. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 496 (Alaska 1975).
20. Id. The court dismissed Ravin’s arguments that the statute also violated
the state and federal equal protection guarantees. Id. at 512.
21. Id. at 497.
22. See id. at 504 (protecting the possession of a substance like marijuana in a
“purely personal, non-commercial context in the home”). The Alaska Supreme
Court rejected Ravin’s federal privacy claim. Id. at 500.
23. Id. at 511. The court spoke only of possession of marijuana in amounts
indicative of non-commercial “personal use,” but did not elaborate on what
constituted a personal amount. Id. It has since become common practice for
Alaska courts to refer to a non-commercial personal amount of marijuana as a
“small” quantity of marijuana. See, e.g., State v. Native Vill. of Tanana, 249 P.3d
734, 748 (Alaska 2011) (“The plaintiffs . . . had challenged a newly enacted
statute criminalizing the possession of small amounts of marijuana, arguing the
statute was unconstitutional under Ravin v. State.”); State v. ACLU of Alaska,
204 P.3d 364, 366 n.4 (Alaska 2009) (“Alaskans have a fundamental right to
privacy in their homes and protecting the possession by adults of small amounts
of marijuana in the home for personal use.”); Hotrum v. State, 130 P.3d 965, 967
(Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (“the right of an adult to possess a small amount of
marijuana in his home for personal use”); Walker v. State, 991 P.2d 799, 801
(Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (Coats, C.J., concurring) (discussing the right to possess
“small quantities of marijuana in the home” for “personal use”); Cleland v. State,
759 P.2d 553, 557 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (“Alaska’s residents enjoy a right of
privacy which extends to protect their right to possess small quantities of
marijuana for personal use in their homes . . . .”).
24. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504.
25. Id. at 508.
26. Id. at 511.

BRANDEIS_V8.0 (DO NOT DELETE)

180

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

12/9/2012 7:20 PM

Vol. 29:2

and the fact that personal autonomy is uniquely prized in Alaska,28 the
court did not see the requisite “close and substantial relationship”
between the state’s asserted interest (protecting the public from the ills
of marijuana use) and the means chosen to advance that interest (a state
law prohibiting all possession and use of marijuana).29 A blanket
marijuana prohibition simply went too far—the available scientific
evidence did not “justify intrusions into the rights of adults in the
privacy of their homes.”30 The state’s marijuana ban was also out of line
with what the court described as a basic tenet of a free society: “the
authority of the state to exert control over the individual extends only to
activities of the individual which affect others or the public at large.”31
The court did, however, recognize that marijuana use was not
completely harmless or without risk.32 The state had a legitimate,
achievable interest in proscribing marijuana use among drivers, whose
ability to safely operate a vehicle would be lowered, and among
“adolescents who may not be equipped with the maturity to handle the
experience prudently. . . .”33 Those factors, combined with the narrow
scope of the decision itself, meant that the state could still regulate and
prohibit most types of marijuana activity without running afoul of the
right to privacy. Ravin did not extend to protect possession or use of
marijuana in public, driving under the influence of marijuana, buying or

27. See id. at 503–04 (identifying the home as a place where “privacy
receives special protection” and noting that the privacy amendment to the
Alaska Constitution “was intended to give recognition and protection to the
home”). An odd twist to Ravin is that Irwin Ravin’s case began when he was
arrested in his car during a traffic stop, not in the privacy of his home. Susan
Orlansky & Jeffrey M. Feldman, Justice Rabinowitz and Personal Freedom: Evolving
A Constitutional Framework, 15 ALASKA L. REV 1, 10 n.53 (1998). But neither the
opinion nor the record before the Alaska Supreme Court “disclose[d] any facts
as to the situs of Ravin’s arrest and his alleged possession of marijuana.” Ravin,
537 P.2d at 513. The court ultimately remanded the case so those facts could be
developed. Id.
28. See id. at 504 (noting Alaska’s unique legacy of individuality and selfreliance).
29. See id. at 511 (“[W]e do not believe that the potential harm generated by
drivers under the influence of marijuana, standing alone, creates a close and
substantial relationship between the public welfare and control of or ingestion of
marijuana or possession of it in the home for personal use.”).
30. Id.
31. Id. This respect for individual rights, and the belief that individuals
should be trusted to make their own decisions, is all the more impressive
considering the court’s feelings about drug use in general. The Ravin court was
very candid with its anti-drug message. Id. at 511.
32. See id. at 508 (“The one significant risk in use of marijuana which we do
find established to a reasonable degree of certainty is the effect of marijuana
intoxication on driving.”).
33. Id. at 511.
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selling marijuana, possession of marijuana in an amount indicative of an
intent to sell, or any marijuana activity involving minors.34
More importantly than its distinctive approach to marijuana
possession, Ravin was a historic decision because it was the first Alaska
Supreme Court opinion to meaningfully define the scope of the Alaska
Constitution’s right to privacy.35 Ravin established the principle that the
Alaska Constitution provides greater protection for individual privacy
rights than does the United States Constitution, a principle that has
become a cornerstone of Alaska jurisprudence.36
Simultaneous with Ravin, the Alaska Legislature decriminalized
marijuana.37 The new law allowed adults to possess one ounce or less of

34. Id.
35. The Alaska Supreme Court previously discussed the privacy
amendment in Gray v. State, which also involved a challenge to the state’s
marijuana laws. 525 P.2d 524, 528 (Alaska 1974) (holding that the right to privacy
“clearly . . . shields the ingestion of food, beverages, or other substances” from
legislative interference). However, the court remanded for an evidentiary
hearing on the health effects of marijuana. Id. The court also noted that the
pending Ravin opinion could control Gray’s case. Id. at 528 n.16.
36. See, e.g., State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d 577, 581
(Alaska 2007) (“Because this right to privacy is explicit, its protections are
necessarily more robust and ‘broader in scope’ than those of the implied federal
right to privacy.”); Anchorage Police Dep’t Employees Ass’n v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 24 P.3d 547, 550 (Alaska 2001) (“We have held that both of these
provisions afford broader protection than their federal counterparts.”); Valley
Hosp. Ass’n, Inc. v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 968 (Alaska 1997)
(“[The Alaska Constitution] provides more protection of individual privacy
rights than the United States Constitution.”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Privacy
and the Alaska Constitution: Failing to Fulfill the Promise, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 29, 31
(2003) (“The Alaska Supreme Court continues, at times, to provide greater
protection for privacy rights under the Alaska Constitution than under the
United States Constitution.”); Orlansky & Feldman, supra note 27, at 26 (“Justice
Rabinowitz treated the adoption of article I, section 22 as underscoring the
importance of the right of privacy in Alaska and supporting adoption of stricter
controls on warrantless government action than is required under the federal
Constitution.”); Michael Schwaiger, Understanding the Unoriginal: Indeterminant
Originalism and Independent Interpretation of the Alaska Constitution, 22 ALASKA L.
REV. 293, 295–96 (2005) (“Because the Federal Constitution provides a sturdy
floor for civil rights, the Alaska Supreme Court’s independent interpretation of
the Alaska Constitution based on Alaska’s local constitutional heritage can serve
to safeguard rights beyond federal constitutional protections.”).
37. This legislation first became law on June 5, 1975, about a week after
Ravin was issued on May 27, 1975. See Act of 1975 § 1, 1975 Alaska Sess. Law Ch.
110, 2 (“Actual effective date: September 2, 1975”). However, the legislature first
submitted the bill on May 16, 1975, 11 days before the Ravin decision was
announced. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 9th Leg., 1st Sess. 1122 (May 16, 1975); ALASKA
H. JOURNAL, 9th Leg., 1st Sess. 1235 (May 16, 1975). Thus the legislature could
not have taken the final Ravin ruling into account when it revised the state’s
marijuana laws—in fact, the Ravin court even pointed out that the act had
recently passed through the state legislature when it was drafting its opinion.
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marijuana in public and any amount of marijuana for personal use in
private with no criminal penalty.38 Such possession would only subject
the offender to a “civil fine of not more than $100.”39 But this still
presented a constitutional conflict as conduct that Ravin declared as
shielded from government intrusion remained subject to statesanctioned consequences through imposition of a civil fine.40
In 1982, the Legislature resolved the conflict by revising the state
criminal code to omit any civil or criminal penalty for an adult’s
possession of less than four ounces of marijuana for personal use in the
home.41 This revision fully embraced and codified the Ravin decision.42
B. The 1990s: Ballot Initiatives, Recriminalization, and Medical
Marijuana
The statutory decriminalization of marijuana in Alaska lasted only
eight years. At the November 6, 1990 statewide general election, Alaska
voters faced a ballot initiative that would make all marijuana possession
in Alaska illegal.43 The language of the initiative was explicit and “in no

Ravin, 537 P.2d at 513 n.75 (“The Alaska legislature have also recently passed a
bill which would decriminalize possession of marijuana in certain contexts.”).
The 1975 legislation therefore should not be viewed solely as a reaction to Ravin,
but rather as evidence that the legislature and the courts were proceeding along
similar tracks with respect to their views on privacy and marijuana.
38. See Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 541 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (outlining the
specific parameters of the legislation).
39. See id.
40. Governor Jay Hammond explained that the new state statutes “were
more restrictive than the law articulated by the Supreme Court” in his decision
to allow the bill to become law without his signature. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 9th
Leg., 1st Sess. 1463–64 (May 16, 1975). Regardless of the conflict with Ravin,
Governor Hammond was still not a supporter of the Bill; he did not believe that
it was in the public’s best interest to expand the use of marijuana. Id. at 1463 .
41. See Noy, 83 P.3d at 542 (“[F]ollowing the legislature’s 1982 revision of the
marijuana laws, there was no penalty (whether criminal or civil) for possessing
less than four ounces of marijuana in one’s home for personal use.”). Under the
1982 legislation, criminal penalties were reinstated for most other types of
marijuana possession. See id. at 541–42 (“Under the newly enacted AS
11.71.050(a)(3)(E), possession of eight ounces of marijuana was made a class A
misdemeanor. Under the newly enacted AS 11.71.060(a)(4), possession of four
ounces or more of marijuana was made a class B misdemeanor. The legislature
also made it a violation to possess any amount of marijuana in a public place.”).
42. See Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257, 260 (Alaska 2000) (“In 1982 the Alaska
legislature codified Ravin by amending AS 11.71.060 to legalize possession of up
to four ounces of marijuana in a private place.”); Walker v. State, 991 P.2d 799,
802–03 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (specifying the purpose of the law was to codify
the amount indicative of personal use so that citizens would know the amount
protected by Ravin).
43. Initiatives Appearing on the Ballot in Alaska, STATE OF ALASKA DIV. OF
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uncertain terms” meant to wipe out the rights provided under Ravin.44
This highly-contested political issue, strongly supported by the federal
government, garnered “a good deal of publicity” in the months leading
up to the election.45
The 1990 Initiative passed by a comfortable margin and the Alaska
Statutes were amended to once again criminalize all marijuana
possession.46 Under the revised statutes, any possession of less than
eight ounces of marijuana was a Class B misdemeanor.47 The exception
for possession of less than four ounces of marijuana was eliminated.
Penalties for possession of larger quantities of marijuana remained
unchanged.

ELECTIONS, 2 (2012), http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/forms/H26.pdf (last
revised May 2, 2012) (Initiative number 88MARI, “Relating to the
Recriminalization of Marijuana”); Alaska Marijuana Criminalization Initiative
(1990), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Alaska_Marijuana
_Criminalization_Initiative_(1990) (last updated July 12, 2012).
44. Winters, supra note 3, at 326.
45. Id. at 326 n.71; Richard Mauer, Recriminalization - Drug War, Right To
Privacy Face Off, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 28, 1990, at M17 (“the War on
Drugs has come to Alaska”); Bennett Urges Alaska Voters to Ban Marijuana, L.A.
TIMES, October 27, 1990, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1990-1027/news/mn-2912_1_alaska-constitution (“Drug policy director William J.
Bennett wrapped up his two-day anti-marijuana campaign in Alaska’s two
biggest cities Friday, beseeching Alaskans to ban cannabis in the Last Frontier.”).
46. See Initiatives Appearing on the Ballot in Alaska, STATE OF ALASKA DIVISION
OF ELECTIONS, 2 (2012), http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/forms/H26.pdf
(last revised May 2, 2012) (105,263 Alaska voters (54.3%) voted “yes” and only
88,644 (45.7%) opposed it).
47. Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 542 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
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Statutory Criminal Penalties For Simple Marijuana Possession In
Alaska (1982 and 1991)48
Quantity of
Marijuana
Less Than 4 Ounces
Less Than 8 Ounces
Less Than 1 Pound
1 Pound or More

1982 Penalty

1991 Penalty

No penalty if possession
is non-public49
Class B Misdemeanor50
Class A Misdemeanor51
Class C Felony52

Class B Misdemeanor53
Class B Misdemeanor54
Class A Misdemeanor55
Class C Felony56

Despite this seemingly conclusive election, the constitutionality of
the 1990 Initiative was “questioned widely” because it purported to
eliminate the limited right of personal marijuana possession protected
under Ravin.57 This set up a legal question that would remain formally
unanswered for over a decade: did the 1990 Initiative actually
“overrule” the Ravin decision?58
An initiative regarding marijuana appeared on the ballot again in
48. This table is not inclusive of all marijuana-related crimes; it lists only
penalties applicable to simple possession under state law.
49. See Noy, 83 P.3d at 542 (summarizing the parameters of the 1982
legislation).
50. ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060(a)(4) (1982) (current version at ALASKA STAT. §
11.71.060 (2012)).
51. § 11.71.050(a)(3)(E) (1982) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.050
(2012)).
52. § 11.71.040(a)(3)(F) (1982) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.040
(2012)).
53. § 11.71.060(a)(1) (1992) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060
(2012)).
54. § 11.71.060(a)(1), (2) (1992) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060
(2012)).
55. § 11.71.050(a)(3)(E) (1992) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.050
(2012)).
56. § 11.71.040(a)(3)(F) (1992) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.040
(2012)).
57. See Orlansky & Feldman, supra note 27, at 11 n.68 (“The constitutionality
of the initiative has been questioned widely, but the Alaska Supreme Court has
not had occasion to rule on the issue.”).
58. See Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257, 260 (Alaska 2000) (“We have yet to
address any conflict between Ravin and AS 11.71.060.”); see also Eric A. Johnson,
Harm to the “Fabric of Society” as a Basis for Regulating Otherwise Harmless Conduct:
Notes on a Theme from Ravin v. State, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 41, 41 n.3 (2003)
(noting that as of 2003 the constitutionality of the 1990 Voter Initiative “has not
been tested in Alaska’s appellate courts, probably because the Attorney General
has declined to enforce it”).
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1998.59 That year, voters approved an initiative that made Alaska one of
the first states to decriminalize marijuana for medical use.60 The 1998
Initiative (and subsequent legislative revisions) established strict
procedures for Alaskans to use marijuana for medical purposes.61 The
Alaska Medical Marijuana Law is distinct from the personal use law
established by Ravin.62 Use of medical marijuana is conditioned upon a
physician’s certification that the patient suffers from a “debilitating
medical condition”63 and that the patient might benefit from the medical
use of marijuana.64 The patient must also register with the state, which
will issue an identification card and maintain a registry of all authorized
users.65 Registered patients may then possess up to one ounce of
marijuana and six plants (of which only three can be flowering and

59. See Initiatives Appearing on the Ballot in Alaska, STATE OF ALASKA DIV. OF
ELECTIONS, 1 (2012), http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/forms/H26.pdf (last
revised May 2, 2012) (under the Initiative No. 97PSDM).
60. See id. (The final vote tally was 131,586 (58.67%) in favor of
decriminalization to 92,701 (41.33%) opposed). California voters passed a
medical marijuana law in 1996; Oregon and Washington voters also approved
medical marijuana ballot initiatives in 1998. See Michael Berkey, Mary Jane’s New
Dance: The Medical Marijuana Legal Tango, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J.
417, 428–30 (2011) (“Passing with 56% of the vote, Proposition 215 made
California the first state to legalize medical marijuana . . . . In 1998, the
Oregonians for Medical Rights-sponsored ‘Measure 67’ ballot passed, making
Oregon the first state to incorporate a registration identification card system for
medical marijuana users. Washington and Alaska voter initiatives also passed in
1998.”).
61. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.37.010–17.37.080 (2012) (codifying the “Medical
Uses of Marijuana for Persons Suffering from Debilitating Medical Conditions
Act.” These statutes included a process for joining the registry of patients
entitled to receive a registry identification card, affirmative defenses to a
criminal prosecution, and restrictions on medical use of marijuana.).
62. See Rollins v. Ulmer, 15 P.3d 749, 750 (Alaska 2001) (“Ravin is inapposite
to the case at hand.”); ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.030(d) (“A person, including a
patient, primary caregiver, or alternate caregiver, is not entitled to the protection
of this chapter for the person’s acquisition, possession, cultivation, use, sale,
distribution, or transportation of marijuana for nonmedical use.”). Individuals
are not required to choose one type of use or the other. There are those who use
marijuana for medicinal purposes at home but who are not registered patients
with the state. See, e.g., State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 370–71 (Alaska
2009) (“Jane Doe declares that she uses marijuana for medicinal purposes,
though she did not register as a medical marijuana user.”).
63. See ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.070(a)–(c) (broadly defining “debilitating
medical condition” as including “cancer, glaucoma, positive status for
immunodeficiency virus, or acquired immune deficiency syndrome” or any
other chronic diseases, or treatment for such diseases, which produce “cachexia;
severe pain; severe nausea; seizures, including those that are characteristic of
epilepsy; or persistent muscle spasms, including those that are characteristic of
multiple sclerosis.”).
64. § 17.37.010(c).
65. § 17.37.010.
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producing usable marijuana at any time).66 They may not smoke
marijuana in public, but may possess it in public under certain
conditions: the marijuana must be in a sealed container, the marijuana
must be concealed, and the individual must be transporting it to a
location where it is permissible to use it.67 A medical marijuana patient
may also designate a “primary caregiver” and an “alternative
caregiver.”68 The caregiver designation means patients with debilitating
illnesses do not have to be responsible for cultivating their own
marijuana.69 The medical marijuana law does not authorize patients or
caregivers to buy or sell marijuana.70 Registered medical marijuana
patients and their caregivers have an affirmative defense to prosecution
for certain marijuana-related crimes.71
C.

2000–2005: Noy and Crocker Breathe New Life Into Ravin

The constitutional issue raised by the passage of the 1990 Initiative
was not addressed by an appellate court until 2003.72 In Noy v. State,73
66. § 17.37.040(a)(4)(A)–(B).
67. § 17.37.040(a)(2)(A)–(C).
68. § 17.37.010(a).
69. See § 17.37.040(a)(3) (“a patient may deliver marijuana to the patient’s
primary caregiver and a primary caregiver may deliver marijuana to the patient
for whom the caregiver is listed”). Neither the Act nor the Alaska
Administrative Code specifically defines the duties of a primary or alternative
caregiver. See §§ 17.37.010–17.37.080 (omitting a definition of a primary or
alternative caregiver). But the Act does explain that if the medicinal marijuana
patient is a minor, the minor’s parent or guardian must serve as the primary
caregiver and “control the acquisition, possession, dosage, and frequency of use
of marijuana by the patient.” § 17.37.010(c)(3). It follows that the caregiver for an
adult patient would serve in a similar role.
70. Alaska law only permits the primary caregiver to “deliver” marijuana to
his or her patient, and vice versa. § 17.37.040(a)(3). “Deliver” means the “actual,
constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled
substance whether or not there is an agency relationship.” § 11.71.900(6).
Conversely, such a noncommercial transfer is not permissible under Ravin. See
Wright v. State, 651 P.2d 846, 849 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (“We conclude that
non-commercial transfers of small quantities of marijuana must be deemed to
fall within the ambit of the prohibition against distribution which is contained in
AS 17.12.010.”).
71. § 17.37.030(a).
72. Prior to Noy, two superior court cases addressed the conflict between
Ravin and the 1990 Initiative. In Alaskans for Privacy v. State of Alaska, filed shortly
after the new law went into effect, plaintiffs sought summary judgment on the
grounds that the Initiative was invalid because it sought to impermissibly
overturn a Supreme Court decision by popular vote. Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief at 4, Alaskans for Privacy v. State, No. 3AN-91-1746 (D.
Alaska March 4, 1991); see also Winters, supra note 3, at 326–27 (“The passage of
the Initiative created an interesting constitutional issue—whether such an
initiative actually had the legal power to ‘overrule’ Ravin . . . . In contrast the
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the Alaska Court of Appeals restricted the enforcement of the statutes
amended by the 1990 Initiative and held that “Alaska citizens have the
right to possess less than four ounces of marijuana in their homes for
personal use.”74
The case began when North Pole, Alaska police officers smelled
growing marijuana at David S. Noy’s home. The police searched Noy’s
home and seized approximately 11 ounces of harvested marijuana and
five immature marijuana plants.75 They did not discover any scales,
packaging materials, nor any other evidence of commercial marijuana
activity.76 Noy was charged with possession of more than eight ounces
of marijuana, a violation of then-AS 11.71.050(a).77 At trial, the State did
not offer the actual marijuana into evidence, relying instead on witness
testimony and photographs.78 Absent that physical evidence, the jury
could not determine the exact amount of marijuana Noy possessed and
acquitted him of the charge of possessing more than eight ounces of
marijuana.79 But it was clear that Noy possessed some amount of
marijuana, so the jury found him guilty of violating AS 11.71.060(a),
which prohibited possession of up to eight ounces of marijuana.80 Noy
appealed, “arguing that he was convicted for engaging in conduct ([i.e.,]
possession of marijuana for personal use in one’s home) that is protected

Initiative merely altered the general Alaska Criminal Code, not the Alaska
Constitution itself.”). The lawsuit was dropped before a final decision on the
merits because Alaskans for Privacy did not have the funding to continue the
litigation through a hearing. Id. at 328. In State v. McNeil, discussed infra, the
defendant was arrested for conduct that was permitted under Ravin but banned
by the Initiative. Memorandum of Decision, State of Alaska v. McNeil, No. 1KE93-947CR 1–2 (D. Alaska October 29, 1993). The Superior Court dismissed the
charges and ruled that Ravin remained the controlling law on the issue of
personal marijuana possession in the home. See id. at 6 (“Accordingly, with no
basis to overrule or even qualify the Ravin decision, it must be applied.”). The
reasoning espoused by Alaskans for Privacy and employed by the judge in
McNeil was also referenced by the Alaska Court of Appeals in Walker v. State. See
991 P.2d 799, 803 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (“To resolve Walker’s case, we need
only hold—and we do hold—that eight ounces or more of marijuana is an
amount large enough to fall within the Ravin court’s category of ‘indicative of
intent to sell.’”). Both the majority and concurring opinions noted that the
constitutionality of the statute amended by the Initiative was “questionable”
because of its conflict with Ravin. Id. at 801, 804.
73. 83 P.3d 538 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
74. Id. at 540.
75. Id. The plants were not tested for THC and did not form part of the
state’s case. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 540.
80. See id. at 543.
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by the privacy provision of the Alaska Constitution.”81
The discrete question presented to the Court of Appeals was
whether AS 11.71.060(a), the statute under which Noy was convicted,
was constitutional to the extent that it prohibited possession of
marijuana by adults in their homes for personal use.82 “To make the
statute conform to the constitution again,” the court returned it to its
pre-1990
interpretation,
which
included
a
“presumptively
constitutional” four-ounce limit on marijuana possession in the home by
adults for personal use.83 In the court’s words, “with respect to
possession of marijuana by adults in their home for personal use
(conduct that is protected under the Ravin decision), AS 11.71.060(a)(1)
remains constitutional to the extent that it prohibits possession of four
ounces or more of marijuana. Restricted in this fashion, AS
11.71.060(a)(1) remains enforceable.”84
The State requested rehearing before the Court of Appeals but was
denied.85 The State then petitioned the Alaska Supreme Court to exercise
its discretionary review of court of appeals cases.86 In its petition for
hearing, the State added an argument that Ravin should be overturned
because new studies demonstrated that marijuana was now more
dangerous than suggested by the scientific evidence presented in
81. Id at 540.
82. Id. at 542.
83. Id. at 543.
84. Id. For Noy, this meant that his conviction would be overturned. The
jury was never asked to determine the precise amount of marijuana Noy
possessed; it only found that it was some amount under eight ounces. Id. It was
possible that the jury could have believed that Noy possessed less than four
ounces, which would have fallen within the scope of what was protected under
Ravin. Id. The court therefore reversed the conviction, but would allow Noy to be
retried if the State believed he possessed at least four but less than eight ounces
of marijuana. Id. at 540, 543–44.
85. Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 545, 549 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) [hereinafter Noy II].
In its petition, the State identified “some half-dozen” ways in which the court
erred. Id. at 546. The court summarily dismissed the State’s argument that Ravin
only created an affirmative defense for individuals who were prosecuted for
possessing marijuana. Id. at 548. The court explained that in the nearly thirty
years since Ravin had been decided, there had been absolutely no suggestion
that Ravin was anything other “than normal constitutional litigation” in which
the Supreme Court restricted the state’s power to legislate in a particular area.
Id. at 547. The court of appeals rejected this exact same argument a few years
later. See State v. Crocker, 97 P.3d 93, 95 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (“We addressed
and rejected this same argument in our opinion on rehearing in Noy . . . .”). The
court also was not swayed by the State’s belief that the Noy decision would
unfairly block the State’s ability to show the need to overturn Ravin or to
prohibit marijuana possession in the future, stating, “The State remains free in
the future to challenge the continuing vitality of Ravin.” Id. at 549.
86. Petition For Hearing at 15, State v. Noy, Supreme Court No. S-11297
(Jan. 5, 2004).
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Ravin.87 Despite this new evidence, the court declined to hear the case.88
That left Noy, and the Legislature’s four-ounce dividing line from 1982,
in place as the controlling law of the state.
Noy remains one of the most significant post-Ravin appellate
rulings to date. Noy made it very clear that conduct protected by a
constitutional right could not be criminalized by statute.89 Neither the
legislature nor the voters could overturn a judicial interpretation of the
constitutional right to privacy.90
By clarifying the legal status of marijuana in Alaska, Noy also
created a unique scenario for law enforcement officials seeking to
establish probable cause to search a residence for evidence of a
marijuana-related crime.91 Unlike most other contraband or illegal
narcotics, marijuana (whether burning, growing, or harvested) carries a
distinct odor.92 Thus, one could establish the presence of marijuana in a
residence by smell alone.93 In other jurisdictions where all marijuana use
and possession is illegal, the odor of marijuana alone is sufficient
probable cause for a search warrant.94 But in Alaska, where personal

87. Id. at 4–11.
88. Order, State v. Noy, Supreme Court No. S-11297 (Sept. 7, 2004).
89. Noy II, 83 P.3d at 542.
90. Id.
91. See Van Buren v. State, 823 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992)
(quoting Badoino v. State, 785 P.2d 39, 41 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990)) (“Probable
cause to issue a search warrant exists when ‘reliable information is set forth in
sufficient detail to warrant a reasonably prudent [person] in believing that a
crime has been or was being committed.’”) (alteration in original).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965) (“A qualified
officer’s detection of the smell of hash has often been held a very strong factor in
determining that probable cause exists so as to allow issuance of a warrant.”);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12–13 (1948) (observing that “a strong odor
of burning opium which . . . was distinctive and unmistakable” was sufficient
evidence for probable cause); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932) (noting
that the mere odor of illegal whiskey can provide probable cause sufficient for a
warrant to search private property); cf. United States v. Tate, 694 F.2d 1217, 1221
(9th Cir. 1982) (finding that because ether has legitimate uses, its odor, absent
additional evidence, does not establish probable cause to issue a search warrant).
93. Many cases show that police officers “find it easy” to detect the presence
of marijuana by smelling burned or burning marijuana, unburned marijuana,
and the odor of marijuana on clothing. See Susan F. Mandiberg, Marijuana
Prohibition and the Shrinking of the Fourth Amendment, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 23,
39–42 (2012) (noting many instances where police officers used plain smell to
identify marijuana).
94. See United States v. Kerr, 876 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he
presence of the odor of contraband may itself be sufficient to establish probable
cause.”); see also United States v. Ramos, 443 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2006) (“It is
well settled that the smell of marijuana alone, if articulable and particularized,
may establish not merely reasonable suspicion, but probable cause.”); United
States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 659 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[I]f an officer smells the
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marijuana possession in the home is permitted under state law, the odor
of marijuana emanating from a residence would establish only the
presence of some unspecified amount of marijuana. It would not
automatically establish the existence of an illegal amount of marijuana.
In State v. Crocker95 the Alaska Court of Appeals addressed this key
practical aspect of implementing the right to privacy and revised the
probable cause standard that must be met before a search warrant could
be issued to search a home for evidence of marijuana-related activity.96
The court held that “a judicial officer should not issue a warrant to
search a person’s home for evidence of marijuana possession unless the
State’s warrant application establishes probable cause to believe that the
person’s possession of marijuana exceeds the scope of the possession
that is constitutionally protected under Ravin.”97 In other words, there
must be “good reason to believe that the law has been broken (and that
evidence of that illegality can be found on the premises to be
searched).”98
The search warrant issued in Crocker did not meet this standard.
The warrant application contained an assertion that the arresting officers
perceived “a strong odor of growing marijuana” when they stood at the
front door of the residence to be searched.99 But the warrant application
did not indicate that the strength of the marijuana odor gave the officers
any indication as to the amount of marijuana that might be growing
inside the home.100 Lacking that connection between odor and amount,
the court of appeals ruled that the officers could not establish probable
cause to believe that anyone inside the house was breaking the law.101

odor of marijuana in circumstances where the officer can localize its source to a
person, the officer has probable cause . . . .”); United States v. Pierre, 958 F.2d
1304, 1310 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“The smell of burned contraband [created]
probable cause to search the vehicle for suspected contraband.”).
95. 97 P.3d 93 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
96. Id. at 94. Prior to Noy, the Alaska Court of Appeals held that an officer
who smelled growing marijuana from a defendant’s home had probable cause to
obtain a search warrant. Lustig v. State, 36 P.3d 731, 733 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
97. Crocker, 97 P.3d at 94; see also Starkey v. State, 272 P.3d 347, 353 n.8
(Alaska Ct. App. 2012) (forbidding search warrants in the absence of probable
cause that the type of marijuana possession at issue is something other than the
type of possession protected by Ravin).
98. Crocker, 97 P.3d at 96.
99. Id. at 97. The search warrant application in Crocker also included
evidence of “higher than average” electricity usage. Id. at 98. The court did not
consider this persuasive evidence of a commercial marijuana grow. Id.
Furthermore, the court had previously ruled that “utility records showing
unusual electrical consumption have no inherent incriminatory value.” Carter v.
State, 910 P.2d 619, 625 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
100. Crocker, 97 P.3d at 97.
101. Id. at 96–97. Judge Coats authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that this

BRANDEIS_V8.0 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012

CONTINUING VITALITY OF RAVIN V. STATE

12/9/2012 7:20 PM

191

Simply smelling the odor of marijuana from outside a residence was not
persuasive evidence that the amount of marijuana being grown inside
exceeded four ounces or was possessed for commercial purposes.102
Following the court of appeals ruling, the State petitioned the
Alaska Supreme Court for review.103 The court again declined to hear a
case implicating Ravin.104
During this time period the Alaska courts formally reaffirmed the
vitality of Ravin and the right to privacy over the statutory changes
made in 1990.105 However, Alaska voters were not interested in further
decriminalization efforts as they rejected ballot initiatives that included
broad marijuana decriminalization plans in both 2000 and 2004.106

holding was a departure from prior cases where the court of appeals found that
an officer who smelled growing marijuana from a defendant’s home had
probable cause to obtain a search warrant. Id. at 99 (Coats, J., dissenting) (citing
Lustig v. State, 36 P.3d 731 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001); Wallace v. State, 933 P.2d
1157 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997); McClelland v. State, 928 P.2d 1224 (Alaska Ct. App.
1996); Landers v. State, 809 P.2d 424 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991)). The majority
distinguished these cases on the grounds that they were issued before the court’s
ruling in Noy and did not directly implicate Ravin. Id. at 96.
102. See id. at 96 (noting that the probable cause standard requires an officer
to suspect the amount, not merely the presence of marijuana). Courts in other
jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions following marijuana
decriminalization. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 910 (Mass. 2011)
(finding that after criminal marijuana statute was amended to make possession
of one ounce or less a civil offense, smell alone no longer constituted probable
cause that a criminal offense had occurred).
103. Petition For Hearing at 8, State v. Crocker, Supreme Court No. S-11651
(Dec. 30, 2004).
104. Order, State v. Crocker, Supreme Court No. S-11651 (Dec. 30, 2004).
105. See Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 543 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (restricting
section 11.71.060(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes from applying to amounts of
marijuana less than four ounces inside the home for personal use); see also
Crocker, 97 P.3d at 97 (holding that law enforcement officers cannot presume the
presence of a prohibited amount of marijuana inside the home by smell alone).
106. See 2000 General Election Ballot Measures, STATE OF ALASKA DIVISION OF
ELECTIONS, http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/oep/2000/bm00.htm#99he
mpsum (last visited Oct. 5, 2012) (outlining pros and cons of ballot measure to
re-legalize hemp); Alaska Marijuana Decriminalization Initiative, Measure 5 (2000),
BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Alaska_Marijuana_
Decriminalization_Initiative,_Measure_5_(2000) (last updated Apr. 20, 2012)
(explaining details of initiative to re-legalize hemp); Alaska Legalize Marijuana
Act, Measure 2 (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php
/Alaska_Legalize_Marijuana_Act,_Measure_2_(2004) (last updated Apr. 20,
2012) (providing overview of the Legalize Marijuana Act); Ballot Measure 2 –
Initiative to Legalize Marijuana, 2004 STATE OF ALASKA OFFICIAL ELECTION
PAMPHLET 90–91, available at http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/oep
/2004/2004_oep_reg_1.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2012) (reprinting statements in
support and opposition of ballot measure to legalize marijuana).
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2006–2009: The Effort to Overturn Ravin

In 2006 the Alaska Legislature passed House Bill 149, which
amended the state’s criminal marijuana statutes so as to prohibit all
marijuana use and possession in Alaska, even by adults in the privacy of
the home.107 This legislation began as two proposed bills presented by
Governor Frank Murkowski during the previous legislative session.108
The impetus behind the Governor’s recriminalization push was that
marijuana had become very potent and dangerous and the Alaska
Supreme Court had shown an “unwillingness to reconsider the latest
scientific evidence on the harmful effects of marijuana.”109 It was
107. See H.B. 149, 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2006); Act effective June 3, 2006,
§§ 7–10, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 53 (detailing language of H.B. 149).
108. In January 2005 Governor Frank Murkowski introduced Senate Bill 74
and House Bill 96 to the 24th Alaska Legislature. S.B. 74, 24th Leg., 1st Sess.
(Alaska 2005); ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. 0112–15 (Jan. 21, 2005)
(reprinting Governor Murkowski’s transmittal letter); H.B. 96, 24th Leg., 1st Sess.
(Alaska 2005) (text of House Bill); ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. 0126–
30 (Jan. 21, 2005) (reprinting Governor Murkowski’s transmittal letter). Neither
bill garnered enough support to pass that session. See Sean Cockerham, Pot Bill
Is Out of Time, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 8, 2005, at A1 (detailing the
expected failure of the bill). The following year the Senate added Governor
Murkowski’s marijuana provisions to House Bill 149, a bill concerning
methamphetamine already approved by the House of Representatives. See
ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. 1029–30 (Apr. 13, 2005) (outlining in
transmittal letter Governor’s proposed revisions); ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 24th Leg.,
2d Sess. 2792–94 (Apr. 18, 2006) (adopting H.B. 149). The House, however,
refused to accept the changes and voted down the Senate’s version of the Bill.
ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 2d Sess. 3212–13 (Apr. 19, 2006) (voting not to
adopt H.B. 149). Governor Murkowski was frustrated by the House’s decision,
and some speculated that he levied intense political pressure on House members
to reconsider their vote. See Matt Volz, House Passes Merged Drug Bill REVERSAL: Measure Restricts Access to Meth Ingredients, Makes Possession of
Marijuana Illegal, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 6, 2006, at A1 (“House Minority
Leader Ethan Berkowitz, D-Anchorage, said he believed the only reason the vote
was reversed was because of pressure on lawmakers by the governor’s office for
Murkowski’s priority bill.”). In an unusual move, the House did indeed rescind
its previous vote, then re-voted and approved the marijuana amendments as an
add-on to the methamphetamine legislation. ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 2d
Sess. 3696–98 (May 5, 2006) (voting to rescind previous action). See H.B. 149, 24th
Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2006) (adding marijuana provisions to methamphetamine
language). The final version of the bill, Conference Committee Substitute for
H.B. 149, was signed into law by the Governor as Alaska Session Law chapter
53, and went into effect the next day. ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 2d Sess.
4152 (June 6, 2006) (reprinting message that bill was signed into law); Act
effective June 3, 2006, §§ 7–10, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 53 (session law
language of new bill).
109. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. 0112–13 (Jan. 21, 2005); ALASKA
H. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. 0127–28; see Order, State v. Noy, Supreme Court
No. S-11297 (Sept. 7, 2004) (denying request to reconsider the reasoning in
Ravin).
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therefore incumbent upon the Legislature to “take a stand” to protect
the health and safety of Alaskans.110
The final bill lowered the thresholds for each marijuana offense,
thereby increasing the criminal penalties for possession of smaller
quantities of marijuana.111 From 1990 to 2006, sections 11.71.060(a)(1)
and (a)(2) of the Alaska Statutes established two overlapping crimes:
possession of any amount of marijuana and possession of less than eight
ounces of marijuana were each class B misdemeanors. House Bill 149
changed the law by making possession of less than one ounce a class B
misdemeanor,112 possession of one to four ounces a class A
misdemeanor,113 and possession of four or more ounces a class C
felony.114 And similar to the statutory changes mandated by the 1990
ballot initiative, there was no exception for personal use or possession in
the home.115 Thus, given the court of appeals’ prior ruling in Noy, the
2006 amendments “effectively re-criminalized possession of small
amounts of marijuana by adults in the privacy of their homes.”116 A
summary of the changes is contained in the following table:

110. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. 0112 (Jan. 21, 2005) (“I believe it
is time for the Alaska Legislature to take a stand and debunk the myth that
marijuana is a harmless recreational drug.”); accord ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 24th
Leg., 1st Sess. 0127 (Jan. 21, 2005) (“I believe it is time for the Alaska Legislature
to take a stand and debunk the myth that marijuana is a harmless recreational
drug.”).
111. See Act effective June 3, 2006, §§ 7–9, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 53
(criminalizing all possession of marijuana). The bill also changed the method for
determining the weight of marijuana contained in growing plants: “For
purposes of calculating the aggregate weight of a live marijuana plant, the
aggregate weight shall be one-sixth of the measured weight of the marijuana
plant after the roots of the marijuana plant have been removed.” Id. § 10
(amending section 11.71.080 of the Alaska Statutes).
112. ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060(a)(2) (2012) (possessing less than one ounce of
marijuana is a class B misdemeanor).
113. § 11.71.050(a)(2)(E).
114. § 11.71.040(a)(3)(F) (possessing four ounces or more of marijuana is a
class C felony).
115. House Bill 149 did make one concession for personal use in the home.
The bill amended the state sentencing guidelines for misdemeanor marijuana
possession. Act effective June 3, 2006, § 16, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 53. Under
the amended section 12.55.135(j) of the Alaska Statutes, a person convicted of
possession of less than one ounce of marijuana in the home for personal use only
faces incarceration if compounding conditions are met, such as if the person had
one or more prior convictions or if the person was on parole or probation.
Otherwise, the maximum penalty for a first offense is a $500 fine, and a $1,000
fine for a second offense. See State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 370 n.32
(Alaska 2009).
116. Zoha Barkeshli, Right of Privacy—Citizens’ Right to Fly High Not Yet Ripe
for Review According to Alaska Supreme Court, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 993, 999 (2010).
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Statutory Criminal Penalties for Simple Marijuana Possession in
Alaska (1991 and 2006)117
Quantity of
Marijuana
Less than 1 Ounce
1 to 4 Ounces
4 to 8 Ounces
8 Ounces to 1 Pound
1 Pound or More

1991 Penalty
Class B Misdemeanor118
Class B Misdemeanor119
Class B Misdemeanor 120
Class A Misdemeanor121
Class C Felony122

2006 Penalty
Class B Misdemeanor123
Class A Misdemeanor124
Class C Felony125
Class C Felony126
Class C Felony127

The 2006 amendments left the state marijuana laws identical in
effect to the laws ruled unconstitutional in both Ravin and Noy.128 This
117. This table is not inclusive of all marijuana-related crimes or any
applicable affirmative defenses; it lists only penalties applicable to simple
possession under state law.
118. ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060(a)(1), (b) (1992) (outlining penalties for less than
eight ounces) (current version ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060 (2012)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. § 11.71.050(a)(3)(E), (b) (1992) (current version ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.050
(2012)) (outlining penalties for eight ounces or more).
122. § 11.71.040(a)(3)(F), (b) (1992) (current version ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060
(2012)) (outlining penalties for one pound or more).
123. § 11.71.060(a)(2), (b) (2012) (outlining penalties for less than one ounce).
A class B misdemeanor is punishable by up to 90 days in prison and a $2,000
fine. § 12.55.135(b) (listing 90 day law); § 12.55.035(b)(6) (listing $2,000 fine).
Possession of any amount of marijuana remained a default Class B
misdemeanor. § 11.71.060(a)(1) (listing penalty for someone who “uses or
displays any amount of a schedule VIA controlled substance”).
124. § 11.71.050(a)(2)(E), (b) (listing penalty for one ounce or more). A Class A
misdemeanor is punishable by up to one year in prison and a $10,000 fine. §
12.55.135(a); § 12.55.035(b)(5). There is no statute that specifically addresses
possession of between one and four ounces of marijuana, but the new section
11.71.040(a)(3)(F) of the Alaska Statutes (amended by Act effective June 3, 2006, §
7, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 53) made possession of four ounces or more a Class
C felony, effectively making section 11.71.050(a)(2)(E) of the Alaska Statutes
applicable only to possession of amounts more than one ounce but less than
four. § 11.71.040(a)(2)(E) (2012).
125. § 11.71.040(a)(3)(F), (d) (2012) (listing penalty for four ounces or more). A
class C felony is punishable by a prison sentence of up to five years and a
$50,000 fine. § 12.55.125(e); § 12.55.035(b)(3).
126. § 11.71.040(a)(3)(F), (d) (listing penalty for four ounces or more).
127. Id.
128. See § 11.71.050; § 11.71.060 (possessing any amount of a schedule VIA
controlled substance is at least a Class B misdemeanor).
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was the first time since Ravin was issued that the Alaska Legislature
passed laws that directly conflicted with Ravin. The Legislature was
aware of this conflict, and acknowledged that a court challenge would
probably follow. The final bill included a series of findings on the health
and social effects of marijuana in order “[t]o assist the courts in
considering these issues.”129 The findings alleged that marijuana usage
rates were higher and modern marijuana was much more potent than
the marijuana commonly used in 1975 when Ravin was decided.130
According to the bill, this increase in potency and usage led directly to
significant negative health and social consequences.131
A thorough critique of the scientific validity of the Legislature’s
findings is beyond the scope of this article.132 However, it should be
noted that the public hearings133 on this legislation called the accuracy
129. Act effective June 3, 2006, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 53.
130. For the complete legislative findings contained in House Bill 149, see Act
effective June 3, 2006, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 53. The Alaska Supreme
Court summarized the findings: “(1) Marijuana potency has increased
dramatically in the last 30 years, particularly in Alaska, and corresponds to an
increase in rehabilitative and hospital treatment related to marijuana use. (2)
Hundreds of Alaskans are treated for marijuana abuse each year, more than half
being children; pregnant women in Alaska use marijuana at a higher rate than
the national average. (3) Many users become psychologically dependent on
marijuana under recognized clinical standards. (4) Early exposure to marijuana
increases the likelihood of health and social problems, including mental health
problems. (5) Many people treated for alcoholism also abuse marijuana, and
alcoholism treatment is more difficult when marijuana is used. (6) Marijuana
affects many body and brain functions; it often contains bacteria and fungi
harmful to humans. (7) A higher percentage of adults and juveniles arrested in
Alaska have marijuana in their systems at the time of arrest. (8) If a parent uses
marijuana, then their children are much more likely to become marijuana users;
studies have shown that criminal penalties increase the perception among
teenagers of the risks of using marijuana, thus reducing use.” State v. ACLU of
Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 367 (Alaska 2009).
131. See Act effective June 3, 2006, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 53
(outlining negative health findings for §§ 7–10).
132. For a review of scientific literature detailing recent findings on
marijuana, see generally Itai Danovitch, Sorting Through the Science on Marijuana:
Facts, Fallacies, and Implications for Legalization, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 91 (2012).
133. In March, April, and May 2005, the Alaska Senate and House of
Representatives held a number of public hearings and received documentary
and testimonial evidence from proponents and opponents of marijuana
decriminalization. See S.B. 74, ALASKA S. HEALTH, EDUC. & SOCIAL SERVS. COMM.
MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Mar. 21, 2005, Mar. 23, 2005, Apr. 1, 2005) (detailing
proceedings from hearings on Senate Bill 74); S.B. 74, ALASKA S. JUDIC. COMM.
MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 11, 2005, Apr. 20, 2005, Apr. 23, 2005, May 3, 2005 (no
public testimony), May 5, 2005) (detailing proceedings from hearings on Senate
Bill 74); H.B. 96, ALASKA H. JUDIC. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 8, 2005, Apr.
12, 2005) (detailing proceedings from hearings on House Bill 96). Additional
hearings were held in early 2006. See S.B. 74, ALASKA S. FINANCE COMM. MINUTES,
24th Leg. (Jan. 10, 2006, Jan. 12, 2006) (listing proceedings from hearings on
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and objectiveness of the legislature’s findings into question.134 The
findings appeared to be predetermined—they were nearly identical to
the proposed findings the Governor submitted prior to any testimony
being heard and consisted of largely the same evidence the state had
previously submitted to the Alaska Supreme Court in support of its
petitions for hearing in Noy.135 And for each point raised by the
Legislature, or proposed by the witnesses who testified in support of the
legislation, scientific experts presented testimony containing opposing
evidence.136
Senate Bill 74).
134. Some senators were very critical of the findings. Senator Hollis French
proposed removing the findings from the bill. The Senator explained that many
experts refuted the findings, “which weren’t proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
‘Science should be in the laboratory and not in the . . . statute.’” H.B. 149, ALASKA
S. CONF. COMM. 24th Leg. (Apr. 12, 2006) (statement of Senator Hollis French at
6:37:54 PM) (alteration in original). The Senator was also concerned that the
House had not had the opportunity to fully analyze and debate the marijuana
issues addressed in the bill. Id. at 6:41:10 PM (expressing concern that not
enough research had been done).
135. Compare S.B. 74 § 2, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2005), and H.B. 96 § 2,
24th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2005), with Petition For Hearing at 6, State v. Noy,
Supreme Court No. S-11297 (Jan. 5, 2004).
136. See S.B. 74 – Crimes Involving Marijuana/Other Drugs, ALASKA S. HEALTH,
EDUC. & SOCIAL SERVS. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 1, 2005) (statement of Dr.
Lester Grinspoon, M.D., Associate Professor of Psychiatry at the Harvard
Medical School at 2:21:19 PM) (“[M]arijuana is no more harmful today than it
was in 1975 when I testified in the Ravin Court.”); S.B. 74 – Crimes Involving
Marijuana/Other Drugs, ALASKA S. JUDIC. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 11,
2005) (statement of Dr. Grinspoon at 10:06:04 AM, 10:08:17 AM) (“Most of what
people are led to believe about the dangers of marijuana is mythical. . . . Street
marijuana is more potent but does not impose increased risk. A user simply uses
less.”); S.B. 74 – Crimes Involving Marijuana/Other Drugs, ALASKA S. HEALTH,
EDUC. & SOCIAL SERVS. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 1, 2005) (statement of Dr.
Mitch Earleywine, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Psychology, University of
Southern California at 2:40:31 PM) (“[T]his substance is not completely harmless,
but certainly nowhere as dangerous as the way it’s been depicted by some of the
physicians that have testified on this bill.”); S.B. 74 – Crimes Involving
Marijuana/Other Drugs, ALASKA S. JUDIC. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 11,
2005) (statement of Dr. Earleywine at 10:43:50 AM) (“Previous testimony
regarding higher levels of marijuana potency has been exaggerated.”); ALASKA S.
FINANCE COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Jan. 12, 2006); H.B. 96, ALASKA H. JUDIC.
COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 12, 2005); S.B. 74, ALASKA S. FINANCE COMM.
MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Jan. 12, 2006); S.B. 74 – Crimes Involving Marijuana/Other
Drugs, ALASKA S. HEALTH, EDUC. & SOCIAL SERVS. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg.
(Apr. 1, 2005) (statement of Dr. Kelly Drew, Associate Professor of Chemistry
and Biochemistry at University of Alaska Fairbanks at 2:51:06 PM) (“[T]he
bottom line of the evidence does not support the assertion that marijuana poses
a threat to public health that justifies prohibiting its use and possession in the
state.”); S.B. 74, ALASKA S. FINANCE COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Jan. 10, 2006); S.B.
74 – Crimes Involving Marijuana/Other Drugs, ALASKA S. HEALTH, EDUC. & SOCIAL
SERVS. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 1, 2005) (statement of Dr. Less Iverson,
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Shortly after House Bill 149 was signed into law, a lawsuit was filed
that challenged the constitutionality of the blanket marijuana
prohibition imposed by the 2006 amendments.137 In ACLU of Alaska v.
State,138 the plaintiffs argued that by outlawing possession of all
marijuana, including possession of small amounts in the home for
personal use by adults, the new laws violated the privacy clause of the
Alaska Constitution as interpreted by Ravin.139 Superior Court Judge
Patricia Collins agreed, declaring the challenged legislation
unconstitutional to the extent it conflicted with Ravin and
“criminalize[d] possession of small amounts of marijuana in the home
by consenting adults for purely personal, non-commercial use.”140 Judge
Collins ruled that stare decisis commanded that Ravin remained the law
“[u]nless and until the supreme court directs otherwise.”141 The judge
did not address the thousands of pages of scientific journals, books,
testimony, and other evidence the parties submitted, nor did she reach
the issue of whether the State’s “new, although disputed, data justifies
revisiting Ravin.”142 That decision was “uniquely within the province of
the Alaska Supreme Court.”143 The State appealed to the Alaska

Professor of Pharmacology at the University at Oxford, England at 3:16:35 PM)
(“[T]he statements in SB 74 give an inaccurate picture of the scientific data about
marijuana . . . . In my view marijuana is a relatively safe drug and its use does
less medical and social harm than alcohol or tobacco.”); S.B. 74 – Crimes Involving
Marijuana/Other Drugs, ALASKA S. JUDIC. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 11,
2005) (statement of Dr. Tim Hinterberger, Ph.D., Associate Professor of
Biomedicine, University of Alaska Anchorage at 10:38:45 AM) (“SB 74 disregards
existing scientific consensus of the health, social, and economic effects of our
current marijuana policy.”); S.B. 74 – Crimes Involving Marijuana/Other Drugs,
ALASKA S. JUDIC. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (May 5, 2005) (statement of Dr.
Hinterberger at 8:58:55 AM, 9:02:41 AM) (“Marijuana is a relatively benign
drug.”); S.B. 74 – Crimes Involving Marijuana/Other Drugs, ALASKA S. JUDIC.
COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 11, 2005) (statement of Dr. Robert Malamede,
Ph.D., Professor of Biology, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs at
10:33:33 AM) (“[M]arijuana has a tremendous amount of positive uses.”).
137. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, ACLU of Alaska v.
State, No. IJU-06-793CI (Alaska Super. Ct. June 5, 2006), 2006 WL 6457041.
138. No. IJU-06-793 CI, 2006 WL 6457870 (Alaska Super. Ct. July 10, 2006).
139. Id. at *2.
140. Id. at *1. Judge Collins’ order was limited to the constitutionality of
section 11.71.060(a) of the Alaska Statutes as it criminalized possession of less
than one ounce of marijuana. Id. at *3 (“This decision is limited to the narrow
issue presented.”). The judge found that plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged
that any plaintiff or ACLU member actually possessed more than one ounce of
marijuana in the home. Id. at *3–4. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ challenge to section
11.71.050(a)(2)(E) of the Alaska Statutes, which recriminalized possession of
more than one ounce of marijuana, was not considered. Id. at *3–4.
141. Id. at *9, *11–12.
142. Id. at *11.
143. Id. at *11–12.
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Supreme Court.
On appeal, in State v. ACLU of Alaska,144 the state argued that Ravin
should no longer control and that a blanket prohibition on personal
marijuana use was justified.145 Relying on the Legislature’s findings, the
state identified numerous factors that had changed since Ravin was
decided: marijuana was much more potent and intoxicating, more
people were using marijuana and were starting to use marijuana at
younger ages, and the adverse consequences of marijuana use were
better understood.146 Conversely, Plaintiffs argued that there were no
grounds to overturn Ravin because marijuana was still a relatively
harmless substance, as it was when Ravin was decided.147 Plaintiffs also
argued that if the supreme court was inclined to reconsider Ravin, the
court should remand the case for an evidentiary hearing to assess the
nature and effects of marijuana use and not blindly defer to the
Legislature’s findings.148
The Alaska Supreme Court did not address any of these arguments.
In a 3-2 opinion, the Court held that the matter was not ripe for review,
vacated the superior court’s decision, and dismissed the case without
reaching the merits of the constitutional issues.149 The court ruled that
any challenge to the constitutionality of the 2006 amendments must
“arise from an actual prosecution brought under the amended
statute.”150
State v. ACLU of Alaska was not decided the way any of the parties
anticipated. The court raised the ripeness issue sua sponte a year after the
initial briefing was completed.151 The parties were united in agreement
that the case was ripe and “asked—indeed, implored” the court to
144. 204 P.3d 364 (Alaska 2009).
145. Id. at 367.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 373–74. See Barkeshli, supra note 116, at 1007 (“The question of
whether the new amendments encroach upon Alaska citizens’ constitutional
right to privacy remains unresolved.”).
150. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 367. Justice Matthews’ majority opinion
explained, “[t]he relaxed approach to ripeness sometimes taken with respect to
pre-enforcement challenges to criminal laws is not appropriate here because
plaintiffs already face a risk of prosecution for home use of marijuana under
federal drug statutes.” Id. In dissent, Justice Carpeneti (joined by Justice
Winfree) disagreed with the risk of federal prosecution and was concerned that
the decision ran counter to long-established Alaska law which reflects a “deepseated commitment to the idea that the doors of Alaska’s courts should be open
to its citizens to the greatest extent possible.” Id. at 374–75 (Carpeneti, J.,
dissenting). For a more detailed discussion of the court’s opinion, see Barkeshli,
supra note 116.
151. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 367.

BRANDEIS_V8.0 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012

12/9/2012 7:20 PM

CONTINUING VITALITY OF RAVIN V. STATE

199

decide on the merits, as this was “a high-profile case in which the
general public as well as the executive and legislative branches of
government [were] interested.”152 The intentional lack of guidance on
the constitutionality of Ravin was particularly troubling to Justice
Carpeneti who argued in dissent that the court should have reached the
merits because “[t]he state needs to know whether the new statute is
constitutional or whether, conversely, Ravin retains vitality. The
plaintiffs need to have the same question answered, or face the difficult
and unfair choice of foregoing possibly constitutionally protected
activity or risking criminal penalties.”153 However, by dismissing the
matter on procedural grounds, the majority tacitly preserved the
continuing vitality of Ravin v. State.
E.

Post-State v. ACLU of Alaska: Ravin and Noy Still Control

State v. ACLU of Alaska did not upset Ravin’s interpretation of the
right of privacy, nor did it limit an adult’s ability to engage in private,
personal marijuana possession and use in any way. It left the law just as
it was after the 2006 marijuana prohibition amendments were passed
and before the litigation challenging those amendments began: the
Alaska criminal marijuana statutes on the books facially conflicted with
a longstanding Alaska Supreme Court decision. Thus, following State v.
ACLU of Alaska, and without any subsequent reported decisions on
point, the legal landscape regarding marijuana in Alaska was, and
remains, identical to how it looked to the court in Noy v. State. It follows
that the same legal analysis employed in Noy applies with respect to the
2006 amendments: “[w]hen a statute conflicts with a provision of [the]
state constitution, the statute must give way . . . a statute which purports
to attach criminal penalties to constitutionally protected conduct is
void.”154 As was the case in Noy, Alaska’s current criminal marijuana
statutes are unconstitutional and unenforceable to the extent they
prohibit conduct protected by Ravin.155
That these statutes remain “on the books” does not bear on the

152. Id. at 373–74, 381 (Carpeneti, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 380 (citations omitted).
154. Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 542 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (internal citations
omitted); see also Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1237 (Alaska 1979) (citing
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)) (finding legislative enactment may
not authorize infringement of constitutional rights); Macauley v. Hildebrand,
491 P.2d 120, 122 (Alaska 1971) (blocking enforcement of Juneau ordinance that
conflicted with state education statute because ordinance conflicted with state
law on matter of statewide concern).
155. Noy, 83 P.3d at 542.

BRANDEIS_V8.0 (DO NOT DELETE)

200

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

12/9/2012 7:20 PM

Vol. 29:2

protections afforded by the right to privacy. A judicial decision limiting
the enforcement and applicability of a statute does not automatically
wipe the statute off the books or require the legislature to revise the
statute. In both Ravin and Noy, the courts ruled that the statutes at issue
were unconstitutional as applied to certain conduct. Following Ravin the
legislature amended the statutes to codify the decision, but following
Noy the text of the Alaska Statutes remained unchanged from the 1990
Initiative and continued to contain a blanket prohibition on marijuana
use.156 The statutes were not revised until 2006 when they were
amended to enhance the penalties for all marijuana use and possession.
Despite the protections afforded by Ravin and Noy, the Alaska Statutes
have stood as an empty prohibition against all personal use and
possession of marijuana since 1991.
This situation is not entirely out of the ordinary. There are many
examples of statutes that are not in line with judicial opinions. Such
“dead letter” statutes have remained on the books long after they were
struck down or were recognized as unenforceable.157 The difference
between the current Alaska marijuana laws and such dead letter statutes
is that the Alaska laws were passed after the courts had ruled that laws
criminalizing personal, private marijuana use were unconstitutional.158
156. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060 (2004) (current version ALASKA STAT. §
11.71.060 (2012)).
157. Alabama’s anti-miscegenation statute, rendered unconstitutional by the
United States Supreme Court in Loving v. Virgina, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), remained
on the books until it was repealed by voter initiative in 2000. ALA. CONST. art. IV,
§ 102 (annulled by Amendment 667 (2000). Twenty-one states still have adultery
laws on the books. Jessica Feinberg, Exposing the Traditional Marriage Agenda, 7
NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 301, 329 (2012) (“In the twenty-one states that still have the
crime of adultery on the books, enforcement of these statutes has become
exceedingly rare.”). In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck down a Texas sodomy
statute, though the statute itself remains on the books with the annotation: “This
section was declared unconstitutional.” 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 2011). A Colorado law making it a crime to deface the
American flag also remains on the books over 30 years after it was struck down.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-11-204 (West 2012); see People v. Vaughn, 514. P.2d
1318, 1324 (Colo. 1973) (striking down law criminalizing flag desecration as
unconstitutional).
158. A similarity can be drawn to the unsuccessful attempts to ban abortion
through legislation that directly conflicts with Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
The South Dakota legislature passed a bill in 2006 that banned all abortion in the
state. H.B. 1215, 81st Leg. (S.D. 2006) (concluding that life begins at conception
and thus banning abortions in South Dakota). This bill never became law; it was
overturned by the voters through a veto referendum. South Dakota Referred Law 6
(2006), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/South_Dakota
_Abortion_Ban_Referendum_(2006). In 2008, South Dakota voters were once
again asked to vote on a bill that would ban all abortion in the state. See South
Dakota Initiative Measure 11 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/
index.php/South_Dakota_Abortion_Ban,_Initiated_Measure_11_(2008).
The
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Regardless, this legislative action does not diminish the value of the
judicial decisions previously issued on nearly identical statutes. Under
these rulings, adults may possess less than four ounces of marijuana in
their homes for purely personal, non-commercial use.159 Under the
current laws, the following are illegal: transporting marijuana out of the
home;160 driving under the influence of marijuana;161 buying or selling
any amount of marijuana;162 possessing marijuana in an amount
indicative of an intent to sell;163 cooperatively growing and distributing
marijuana, even if the growing operation was intended only for the
personal use of those involved;164 giving away marijuana;165 and
possessing marijuana if the possessor is a minor.166

II. THE CONTINUING VITALITY OF RAVIN V. STATE
Several layers of legal protection secure the continuing vitality of
Ravin v. State. Current Alaska Department of Law policy suggests that
no one should be arrested (or subsequently prosecuted) for conduct
protected by Ravin.167 If followed, that policy will make it impossible for

purpose of these measures was to overturn Roe v. Wade. See Nicholas Riccardi,
Initiatives to Curb Abortion Defeated, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A18, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/05/nation/na-states5
(“The
most
prominent initiative was a measure put on the ballot in South Dakota to outlaw
most abortions in hope of triggering a Supreme Court showdown over the
landmark 1973 case Roe vs. Wade.”); Evelyn Nieves, S.D. Abortion Bill Takes Aim
at ‘Roe,’ WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/22/AR2006022202424.html
(“South
Dakota
lawmakers yesterday approved the nation’s most far-reaching ban on abortion,
setting the stage for new legal challenges that its supporters say they hope lead
to an overturning of Roe v. Wade.”). That the statutes to be created by these
ballot measures would be facially unconstitutional is almost irrelevant to those
who supported the measures—the purpose was to get the issue in front of
judges who might now be inclined to overturn Roe. Id.
159. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975); Noy, 83 P.3d at 543.
160. Belgarde v. State, 543 P.2d 206, 207 (Alaska 1975) (clarifying that Ravin
does not protect possession of marijuana in a public place).
161. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511.
162. Id.
163. Id.; see also Brown v. State, 565 P.2d 179, 180 (Alaska 1977) (reaffirming
that Ravin offers no constitutional protection regarding the buying or selling of
marijuana).
164. Garhart v. State, 147 P.3d 751, 751 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
165. Wright v. State, 651 P.2d 846, 849 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (finding the
noncommercial transfer of marijuana falls within the statutory prohibition
against distribution of marijuana).
166. See Allam v. State, 830 P.2d 435, 441 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (finding the
Alaska legislature acted constitutionally when it established a minimum age for
possession and use of marijuana).
167. New Marijuana Laws, ALASKA DEP’T OF LAW (May 12, 2006),
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a court to consider a challenge to Ravin because State v. ACLU of Alaska
requires prosecution under the new marijuana prohibition statutes as a
condition of justiciability for a Ravin-based claim. Should a court
eventually have occasion to revisit Ravin, stare decisis would then stand
in and preserve the decision because all lower court judges must abide
by Ravin. Further, stare decisis establishes a very high threshold that
would have to be met before the Alaska Supreme Court could change
course and deviate from its now thirty-seven year-old precedent. The
court would have to be convinced that marijuana use has become such a
threat to public health and welfare that the state has no choice but to
completely proscribe it, even if that means reaching into the home and
regulating private conduct. This standard would be difficult to meet as
the scientific community is far from being in agreement about the
dangers of marijuana use.
Considering all of these factors, there is currently very little room
for a court to take up this matter, let alone for the Alaska Supreme Court
to overturn Ravin.
A.

Ripeness and Prosecutorial Discretion Insulate Ravin from
Future Challenges

Following State v. ACLU of Alaska, any challenge to the
constitutionality of Alaska’s new criminal marijuana statute, and
thereby an opportunity for a court to consider Ravin, must await an
actual prosecution under that statute.168 Such a case will not easily
present itself. The Alaska Supreme Court notes that arrests and
prosecutions for misdemeanor marijuana possession in Alaska are
historically rare.169 Even if an activist was willing to be subject to arrest

http://law.alaska.gov/press/releases/2006/051206-Marijuana.html.
168. State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 367 (Alaska 2009). The language
contemplates any reconsideration of Ravin arising in the criminal context, which
does not provide a direct path back to the Alaska Supreme Court. Under
Alaska’s Appellate Procedure Rules, the Alaska Court of Appeals hears all
appeals from final decisions by the superior court or the district court in criminal
cases. ALASKA R. APP. P. 202(b) (2012); ALASKA STAT. § 22.07.020 (2012). The
Alaska Supreme Court maintains discretionary review of court of appeals
decisions. As explained, the Alaska Supreme Court could continue to decline to
consider any Ravin-related issues.
169. See ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 371 (“[P]rosecutors and police
departments generally are not interested in pursuing individuals who merely
possess small quantities of marijuana in their home for personal use.”). From
2006 to 2008 the State filed just over 3,000 cases alleging violation of section
11.71.060 of Alaska Statutes (Misconduct Involving a Controlled Substance in the
Sixth Degree—Possession of Marijuana). Id. at 377. This information does not
identify the number of cases, if any, that included conduct protected under
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in order to mount a constitutional challenge as Irwin Ravin did,170 that
would not guarantee judicial review. “[P]rosecutors and police
departments generally are not interested in pursuing individuals who
merely possess small quantities of marijuana in their home for personal
use.”171 To the extent that individuals are arrested for such conduct, it is
often incident to investigation of other crimes172 and the charges are
typically dropped before trial.173 This practice is consistent with the fact
Ravin. At this time there are no comprehensive empirical studies identifying the
number of arrests or prosecutions for misdemeanor marijuana possession that
stemmed from personal use and possession of less than four ounces of
marijuana in the home by adults.
170. See Richard Mauer, Recriminalization—Drug War, Right To Privacy Face
Off, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 28, 1990, at M17 (discussing libertarian
activists willing to undergo arrest in order to challenge the statute on
constitutional grounds); Jill Burke, Irwin Ravin, Alaska Marijuana Rights Activist,
Dies, ALASKA DISPATCH (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.alaskadispatch.com/
article/irwin-ravin-alaska-marijuana-rights-activist-dies (reporting the death of
Irwin Ravin and discussing his life as a marijuana activist); James Halpin,
Attorney Who Forced Marijuana Issue, Dies in Anchorage, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS
(Apr. 13, 2010, 11:37 AM), http://www.adn.com/2010/04/12/1223213/
attorney-who-forced-marijuana.html (reporting the death of Irwin Ravin and
discussing his life as a marijuana activist); Marijuana Lawyer Irwin Ravin Dies in
Anchorage, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Apr. 14, 2010), http://juneauempire.com/stories
/041410/sta_608718010.shtml (reporting the death of Irwin Ravin and
discussing his life as a marijuana activist).
171. State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 371 (citing Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511
n.70).
172. See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511 n.70 (“Statistics indicate that few arrests for
simple possession occur in the home except when other crimes are
simultaneously being investigated. The trend in general in law enforcement
seems to be toward minimal effort against simple users of marijuana, and
concentration of efforts against dealers and users of more dangerous
substances.”).
173. The recent case of Eva Anniskett of Point Lay, Alaska is illustrative:
“After getting a tip on March 28, [2011,] North Slope Borough police arrived at
Anniskett’s house and ‘obtained consent to search her home,’ according to a
press release from the department. Police found 1 gram of marijuana . . . . They
forwarded a charge of sixth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance
to the district attorney’s office in Barrow, a class B misdemeanor.” Alex
DeMarban, Small Marijuana Bust on North Slope Raises Eyebrows at ACLU, THE
ARCTIC SOUNDER (Apr. 1, 2011, 3:55 PM), http://www.thearcticsounder.com
/article/1113small_marijuana_bust_on_north_slope_raises. Ms. Anniskett was
not prosecuted—the state declined to charge her with a crime—and even if Ms.
Anniskett were tried, the charges could not have survived a dismissal motion in
light of the controlling Ravin and Noy decisions. See also Jill Burke, New Alaska
Medical Marijuana Clinic Banks on Hazy Enforcement Policies, ALASKA DISPATCH
(July 13, 2012), http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/new-alaska-medicalmarijuana-clinic-banks-hazy-enforcement-policies (noting that “[a]t least three
Alaskans busted on pot charges have had their court cases tossed based on
Ravin’s precedent”). However, following State v. ACLU of Alaska, there remains
an open question as to whether the facts of Ms. Anniksett’s situation would
create a justiciable civil case challenging the constitutionality of the 2006
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that Alaskans have had the right to private personal marijuana use
under state law since 1975.
Just before the 2006 amendments to Alaska’s criminal marijuana
statutes were signed into law by the Governor, the Alaska Attorney
General instructed all law enforcement officers in the state to continue to
respect an adult’s right to “nonpublic possession of less than four
ounces of marijuana by adults.”174 Under this non-enforcement policy,
no one was to be arrested for conduct protected by Ravin and Noy but
prohibited by “[t]he new marijuana law.”175 This directive was to remain
in place until the courts had an opportunity to address the
constitutionality of the new law.176 There is no record of the nonenforcement policy being repealed, and its existence places another
barrier between Ravin and the courts.177
The non-enforcement policy acknowledged respect for the
separation of powers and the proper roles of the executive and
legislature vis-à-vis the judiciary.178 Authorities intended for the policy
amendments.
174. New Marijuana Laws, ALASKA DEP’T OF LAW (May 12, 2006),
http://law.alaska.gov/press/releases/2006/051206-Marijuana.html; see also
State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 380 n.40 (Carpeneti, J., dissenting) (stating
that “[i]ndeed, today’s opinion may put enforcement of the new laws on hold
indefinitely. Following enactment of the current law, the attorney general issued
a law enforcement bulletin” and quoting the bulletin at length).
175. New Marijuana Laws, supra note 174 (“The new marijuana laws created
by House Bill 149, which will soon be signed by Governor Murkowski, will
immediately affect those who possess four ounces or more, but will make no
immediate change in police authority regarding personal possession of under
four ounces by adults in homes.”).
176. See id. (“The state will vigorously litigate all these legal issues because
it’s important that the courts overrule these prior decisions. . . . [But, w]e live
under the rule of law, and full implementation of the marijuana law is ultimately
up to the courts.”).
177. A search of Department of Law Press Releases shows that no further
public statements regarding marijuana prosecution have been issued. See Press
Releases, ALASKA DEP’T OF LAW, http://www.law.alaska.gov/press/news.html
(providing searchable database of press releases and containing no further
public statements regarding marijuana prosecution). Further, in 2011, the Alaska
Department of Law’s spokesman was unaware “of anyone who’s been
prosecuted by the state for possessing small amounts” of marijuana. DeMarban,
supra note 173. That statement is consistent with the non-enforcement policy.
However, whether the directive is strictly followed in practice throughout the
state is uncertain. Two recent comments indicate that it is not. The Anchorage
Police Department spokesperson stated unequivocally that anyone found with
any marijuana in their homes would be arrested unless they were a registered
medical marijuana user. An Alaska State Assistant District Attorney confirmed
this view of the law, but explained that decisions to prosecute would be made
“case by case.” Burke, supra note 173.
178. No Alaska Attorney General opinion addressing the 2006 Amendments
has been issued, but the May 2006 policy directive follows the logic of a 1989
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to shield individuals from the risk of prosecution for conduct that was
still constitutionally protected, which was necessary during a confusing
time. Indeed, this may have initially saved Alaska’s strong privacy
protections from becoming lost in a constitutional Twilight Zone—a
limbo where no citizen could be truly sure what the law meant or what
his or her rights are. But the policy did not contemplate the Alaska
Supreme Court’s eventual ruling on ripeness in State v. ACLU of Alaska.
It now couples with that decision to block any clear path for a court to
review Alaska’s personal use marijuana laws. It creates a legal Catch-22:
Alaska courts cannot address the constitutionality of the 2006
amendments as they apply to conduct protected by Ravin until law
enforcement starts arresting people for possession of small amounts of
marijuana in their homes. Under current policy, law enforcement should
not arrest anyone for possession of small amounts of marijuana in their
homes until the courts have addressed the constitutionality of the 2006
amendments. As Justice Carpeneti noted in his dissent in State v. ACLU
of Alaska, “today’s opinion may put enforcement of the new laws on
hold indefinitely.”179
The executive branch of the Alaska government is now squarely in
the middle of the Ravin debate. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in
which a state or local law enforcement officer completes an arrest and
triggers Ravin litigation, regardless of the Alaska Attorney General’s
policy directive.180 And the Attorney General could certainly revise the
non-enforcement policy and encourage prosecution of low-level
marijuana offenses. This would open the door for a court to potentially
reconsider Ravin, but making such a change solely to provide a distant
opportunity for a court to review the 2006 amendments would come at a
great cost. First, it could significantly shift the Department of Law’s
practice away from what it was before the directive, when simple
possession of small amounts of marijuana in private was a nonexistent
prosecutorial priority.181 This would be a poor use of investigative and

Alaska Attorney General opinion discussing the 1990 Initiative. Winters, supra
note 3, at 342 (citing ALASKA OP. ATT’Y GEN. 227 (1989)). In that opinion the
Attorney General did not state whether or not the Initiative was constitutional
because “a review of the substantive constitutionality of a bill . . . must await
post-enactment litigation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 380 n.40 (Carpeneti, J., dissenting).
180. See DeMarban supra note 173; Burke supra note 173.
181. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 n.70 (Alaska 1975) (“Statistics
indicate that few arrests for simple possession occur in the home except when
other crimes are simultaneously being investigated. The trend in general in law
enforcement seems to be toward minimal effort against simple users of
marijuana, and concentration of efforts against dealers and users of more
dangerous substances.”).

BRANDEIS_V8.0 (DO NOT DELETE)

206

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

12/9/2012 7:20 PM

Vol. 29:2

prosecutorial resources.182 Second, it would charge Alaska’s law
enforcement agencies with the awkward task of having to enforce what
are in effect dead letter statutes that compromise individual privacy
rights. Third, and most importantly, it would chill the right of privacy
by placing Alaskans in fear of prosecution for engaging in what is still
constitutionally protected conduct.183 Ultimately, such a decision would
create more problems than it would solve, especially in light of the very
high threshold that must be met before the Alaska Supreme Court could
even consider overturning Ravin, as discussed in detail below. A more
prudent course would be for the Attorney General to confer with other
state law enforcement officials and announce either continued respect
for the 2006 policy directive or a revised marijuana enforcement
policy.184 But if the Attorney General were to formally dissolve the nonenforcement policy, he or she should do so with great caution and clear

182. See SCOTT W. BATES, THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF MARIJUANA
LEGALIZATION IN ALASKA 27 (2004) (“[M]arijuana prohibition costs the State of
Alaska well over $24 million annually in direct and indirect costs of
enforcement.”); see also Alex Kreit, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on
Federal Drug Laws in an Age of State Reforms, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 555, 575 (2010) (“the
federal effort to block state medical marijuana laws has . . . drained federal drug
enforcement resources from other priorities”); Andrew J. LeVay, Note, Urgent
Compassion: Medical Marijuana, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Medical Necessity
Defense, 41 B.C. L. REV. 699, 744 (2000) (“precious law enforcement resources
should be used to prevent violent crimes that endanger the safety of [the state’s]
citizens”); Jesse Norris, THE EARNED RELEASE REVOLUTION: EARLY
ASSESSMENTS AND STATE-LEVEL STRATEGIES, 95 Marq. L. Rev. (2012)
1551, 1627 (“Several cities and states have recently decriminalized or are
currently considering decriminalizing marijuana, often motivated by the
potential budgetary savings.”)
183. See, e.g., ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 378 (Carpeneti, J., dissenting)
(“Consider the individual who comes home one evening to find a window
broken in his home and the door slightly ajar. The individual knows that he left
a small container of marijuana in the open on his coffee table. He must now
decide whether he should call the police and expose himself to prosecution for
possession of less than one ounce of marijuana in his home, or enter the house
by himself and risk encountering an intruder. . . . [The individual] currently
engaging in activities that this court has previously declared [in Ravin and Noy]
as protected under the Alaska Constitution will be chilled in the exercise of those
activities by the very real risk of a state prosecution.”).
184. It has been six years since the non-enforcement policy was implemented
in 2006. During that time Alaska has had three Governors, five different
Attorneys General, and numerous new prosecutors and police officers. The
policy was implemented under Attorney General Marquez and Governor Frank
Murkowski.
See
List
of
Governors
of
Alaska,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Governors_of_Alaska (last visited Sept.
3, 2012) (listing all Governors of Alaska); see also Attorneys General of Alaska,
STATE
OF
ALASKA
DEP’T
OF
LAW,
http://www.law.state.ak.us/
department/ag_past.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2012) (listing all Attorneys
General of Alaska).
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guidance as to what he or she expects from law enforcement in order to
minimize inconsistent application of the state’s criminal marijuana laws.
B.

Alaska Lower Courts Remain Duty-Bound to Abide By Ravin

The principle of stare decisis mandates that prior “decisions of
higher courts take preceden[t] over the decisions of lower courts.”185
Thus Ravin still controls every Alaska court’s review of a statute that
penalizes private personal marijuana use.186 Though these decisions are
not binding,187 several prior superior court cases have addressed
conflicts with Ravin and guide how trial court judges should respond if
the Alaska Department of Law were to rescind its directive requiring
law enforcement agencies to respect Ravin and Noy and begin
prosecuting individuals for possession of small amounts of marijuana in
their homes.
In 1992, Patrick McNeil was arrested for conduct that was banned
by the 1990 Initiative but permitted under Ravin: he was an adult (22
years old) in possession of a small amount of marijuana (0.21 grams, or
0.0074 ounces) in his home for personal use.188 McNeil moved to
suppress the evidence and dismiss the charges under Ravin.189 Superior
Court Judge Michael A. Thompson agreed and dismissed the case,
ruling that the statutes amended by the initiative that conflicted with
Ravin were essentially legally irrelevant in light of stare decisis.190 Though
the judge did consider the possibility that conditions had changed and a

185. Klumb v. State, 712 P.2d 909, 913 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (“This follows
the general rule that decisions of higher courts take precedence over the
decisions of lower courts.”).
186. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1373 (E.D.
Pa. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(“[O]nly [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents . . . .”).
187. See Ostrosky v. Alaska, 913 F.2d 590, 596 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Alaska
superior court decisions are not binding on other Alaska superior courts.”).
188. State v. McNeil, No. 1KE-93-947 CR, at *1 (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 29,
1993).
189. Id. at *2 (“Defendant has moved to suppress the evidence taken under
the warrant on the grounds that there was insufficient probably [sic] cause for
the issue of the warrant; the search exceeded the scope of the warrant; and,
finally, that AS 11.71.060(a)(1) violates article I, Section 22 of the State
Constitution (the right to privacy) inasmuch as it criminalizes the personal
possession of marijuana by adults for use in one’s home.”).
190. Id. at *6; see also Winters, supra note 3, at 329 (“[T]he prosecution in
McNeil presented no evidence to suggest that new scientific data regarding the
effects of marijuana invalidated the basis for the Ravin decision. Therefore, Judge
Thompson felt he had ‘no basis to overrule or even qualify the Ravin decision’
and he dismissed the charges against McNeil.’”).
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departure from Ravin was justified: “[s]cience marches on. Perhaps there
is now in existence sufficient evidence in the scientific community to
persuade [the supreme court] that the State does have an adequate
justification to intrude on individual privacy in the manner sought by
[the statute].”191 The State did not present any such evidence, nor make
any argument on this point.192 Accordingly, the judge had “no basis to
overrule or even qualify the Ravin decision.”193
Scientific evidence regarding the health and social effects of
marijuana later played a role in State v. Mahle.194 Mahle was indicted on
numerous weapons and controlled substance charges in 2000.195 In 2006,
while awaiting sentencing, he moved to suppress evidence under the
Crocker rule.196 In response the State sought to present scientific evidence
that marijuana was a greater public health concern than it was when
Ravin was decided.197 The State asserted that it could establish that
marijuana was now so dangerous that Alaska law should be changed to
criminalize even possession of small amounts of marijuana in the home
for personal use.198 The State’s rationale was that if it could establish that
Ravin was no longer good law, then the subsequent decisions in Noy and
Crocker would no longer be binding and there would be no legal
justification to grant Mahle’s suppression motion.199 Judge Volland
denied the State’s request for a “Ravin Hearing.”200 The judge declared
that stare decisis left him without authority to overrule Ravin and that
even if the state’s new research was well founded, it did “not somehow
191. McNeil, No. 1KE-93-947 CR, at *6.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. No. 3:06-cv-00255 JWS, 2007 WL 2021814 (D. Alaska July 10, 2007).
195. See id. at *1 (“The charges were based on evidence seized after a series of
four search warrants were executed at his home . . . .[And] Mahle was convicted
of most of the charges.”).
196. Id.; see also State v. Crocker, 97 P.3d 93, 94 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (“[A]
judicial officer should not issue a warrant to search a person’s home for evidence
of marijuana possession unless the State’s warrant application establishes
probable cause to believe that the person’s possession of marijuana exceeds the
scope of the possession that is constitutionally protected under Ravin.”).
197. Mahle requested a hearing in order to establish that the warrant was
issued absent sufficient probable cause to believe that he was engaged in illegal
conduct. The state opposed Mahle’s motion to suppress and joined his request
for an evidentiary hearing. However, in its request, the state took the
extraordinary step of requesting its own evidentiary hearing on an issue Mahle
did not even raise. The State “requested an evidentiary hearing to show
sufficient justification for the criminalization of the possession [of] any amount
of marijuana, regardless of where it occurs.” Order Denying Ravin Hearing at 1,
State v. Mahle, Case No. 3AN-S00-8212 CR, at *1 (Mar. 29, 2006).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at *3.
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empower this court to ignore legal precedent.”201 Judge Volland also
noted that the scientific studies the State wanted him to consider were
the same studies the State put before the supreme court in its
unsuccessful Petition for Hearing in Noy.202 Judge Volland saw “no
compelling reason to do that which the Alaska Supreme Court has
expressly declined to do.”203 This ruling was consistent with a lower
court’s obligation to apply precedent even in light of new evidence that
might impact the decision, as trial courts may not circumvent stare
decisis by speculating on how such evidence might be viewed by the
Alaska Supreme Court.204
Similarly, Judge Collins’ ruling in ACLU of Alaska v. State provides a
roadmap for how a trial court should handle a ripe challenge to the
state’s criminal marijuana statutes: the challenged statutes should be
declared unconstitutional to the extent they conflict with Ravin and its
progeny.205 The court should not defer to legislative findings and should
not acquiesce to a request for an evidentiary hearing absent specific
direction from the Supreme Court.206 Ravin does not provide a
framework for trial courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether
current data about marijuana establishes that the government has a
sufficient interest in prohibiting possession of small amounts of

201. Id.
202. Id. at *2.
203. Id.
204. See United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“[S]peculation does not permit us to ignore controlling Supreme Court
authority.”); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 238 (1997) (“The trial court
acted within its discretion in entertaining the motion with supporting
allegations, but it was also correct to recognize that the motion had to be denied
unless and until this Court reinterpreted the binding precedent.”); Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a
precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should
follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions.”); United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 986 (9th
Cir. 2004) (“[W]e cannot properly overrule this course of precedent in
anticipation of a new directive that the Court has not yet issued.”); but see PNC
Bank Corp. v. W.C.A.B. (Stamos), 831 A.2d 1269, 1282 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003)
(“[M]any authorities have suggested that in an appropriate case ‘anticipatory
overruling’ may be not only permissible, but an obligation . . . .We believe that
the best view is that such action should be taken only in the extraordinary
circumstance in which there can be no serious question as to our Supreme
Court’s intention.”).
205. See generally ACLU of Alaska v. State, No. IJU-06-793 CI, 2006 WL
6457870 (Alaska Super. Ct. July 10, 2006).
206. See id. at *12 (“[Ravin] is the law until and unless the supreme court takes
contrary action.”).
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marijuana by adults in their homes.207 Thus, while “[t]he State remains
free to challenge the continuing vitality of Ravin,”208 trial courts are not
required to hold an evidentiary hearing whenever the State argues it has
new scientific evidence, nor must the courts blindly defer to legislative
findings on this point. It is up to the Alaska Supreme Court alone to
determine if the state has met the factual burden to warrant revisiting
Ravin.209 Trial courts remain “duty bound” to follow Ravin “[u]nless and
until the supreme court directs otherwise.”210
C.

The Circumstances Under Which The Alaska Supreme Court Can
Overturn Ravin Are Closely Circumscribed

The Alaska Supreme Court must employ a stringent analysis before
it can deviate from one of its previous rulings. Stare decisis cautions the
court to not “lightly overrule [its] past decisions.”211 But this doctrine is
not a rigid paradigm or an “inexorable command.”212 It allows for legal
207. Id.; see also Noy II, 83 P.3d 545, 546–47 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (“The Ravin
decision does not speak of an affirmative defense of the type proposed by the
State in its petition for rehearing, nor does the Ravin opinion describe itself as
establishing case-specific limits on the State’s enforcement of marijuana
statutes.”); but see Agostini, 521 U.S. at 238 (“The trial court acted within its
discretion in entertaining the motion with supporting allegations, but it was also
correct to recognize that the motion had to be denied unless and until this Court
reinterpreted the binding precedent.”). In the interests of judicial economy, it
would be unwise to hold a lengthy evidentiary hearing on the science of the
health and social effects of marijuana without prior direction from the Supreme
Court.
208. Noy II, 83 P.3d at 549.
209. Brown v. Board of Education underscores the proper role of lower courts
vis-à-vis the Supreme Court. 347 U.S. 483, 486–88 (1954) (asserting that lower
courts are bound by U.S. Supreme Court precedent). Brown was actually a
consolidated opinion covering four class action cases. Id. In three of the cases,
federal district courts denied relief to the plaintiffs and upheld the “separate but
equal” doctrine announced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), even though
there was social science evidence establishing that “[s]egregation of white and
colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored
children.” Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at
494 n.10 (stating that a state supreme court likewise held that it must adhere to
Plessy, but ordered relief for the plaintiffs on other grounds). The decision in
Brown overruled longstanding precedent, but it was the Supreme Court – and
not a lower court – that issued the ruling; the lower courts were bound by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Plessy. The same respect for the Alaska Supreme
Court’s role should be in place here: it is the only court with the power to
overrule Ravin or to order a hearing to consider facts related to whether it
should be overruled.
210. ACLU of Alaska v. State, No. IJU-06-793 CI, 2006 WL 6457870, at *9
(Alaska Super. Ct. July 10, 2006).
211. State v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604, 610 (Alaska 1986).
212. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Although adherence to
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theory to evolve as society does: courts are free to reinterpret their own
holdings in light of changed facts, circumstances, norms, and social
conditions.213 “[S]tare decisis is a practical, flexible command that
balances our community’s competing interests in the stability of legal
norms and the need to adapt those norms to society’s changing
demands.”214 Still, the circumstances under which a prior decision can
be invalidated are closely circumscribed. The Alaska Supreme Court
“will overrule a decision only when convinced: (1) ‘that the rule was
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed
conditions,’ and (2) ‘that more good than harm would result from
a departure from precedent.’”215 Moreover, the Court will not reverse its
precedent unless it is “clearly convinced” that both prongs of the
standard have been met.216
Here, there is no support for the argument that Ravin was
“originally erroneous.”217 A number of trial courts, the Alaska Court of
Appeals, and the Alaska Supreme Court have consistently affirmed
Ravin’s interpretation of the Alaska Constitution’s right of privacy218 and

the doctrine of stare decisis is usually the best policy, the doctrine is not an
inexorable command. This Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent
when governing decisions are unworkable or badly reasoned.”); see also
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (“[Stare decisis] is a principle of
policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.”);
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy . . . [However,] in cases
involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is
practically impossible, this court has often overruled its earlier decisions.”).
213. See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
214. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Alaska
1993); see also State v. United Cook Inlet Drift Ass’n, 895 P.2d 947, 953 (Alaska
1995) (“[T]he judicial doctrine of stare decisis accords the prior holdings of the
highest courts of this State precedential value while still permitting the
reconsideration of legal issues when conditions warrant.”) .
215. State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 757–58 (Alaska 2011) (quoting Sheehan, 852
P.2d at 1176) (citation omitted).
216. See Dunlop, 721 P.2d at 610 (quoting State v. Souter, 606 P.3d 399, 400
(Alaska 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lawson v. Lawson,
108 P.3d 883, 887–88 (Alaska 2005) (applying both prongs of the stare decisis
standard to a prior opinion permitting judicial promulgation of child-support
rules and declining to overrule that decision).
217. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (1993) overturning Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and
it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent.”).
218. See, e.g., Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257, 260 (Alaska 2000) (“We have not
overruled Ravin.”); Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1135
(Alaska 1989) (recognizing the “fundamental right” of privacy protects the
personal use of marijuana by adults in the home) (quoting Ravin, 537 P.2d at 502)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 544 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2003) (invalidating a statute that purported to criminalize any and all
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the balancing analysis employed in Ravin “has become the trademark of
Alaska’s constitutional cases.”219 The recent challenges to the continuing
vitality of Ravin have instead focused on the “changed conditions”
prong of the stare decisis test. “Changed conditions” exist when “related
principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no
more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, [or] facts have so changed
or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application.”220 With this in mind, the argument for
overturning Ravin follows this logic: (1) marijuana is much more potent
and dangerous now than it was when Ravin was decided; (2) increased
use of such higher potency marijuana has led to significant negative
health and social consequences; (3) these negative health and social
effects give the state an interest sufficient to justify restricting all
personal marijuana use and possession, even that by adults in the
privacy of their homes.221
This theory was explicit in Ravin itself. The court’s decision was
based on analysis of contemporaneous scientific evidence concerning the
social and health effects of marijuana use. The court found that the
effects of the lower-potency marijuana that was commonly consumed in
the United States at the time were “not serious enough to justify
widespread concern. ”222 The court did not see “any great likelihood of a
significant shift in use to the more potent” forms of marijuana available

marijuana possession); Noy II, 83 P.3d 545, 549 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (declining
rehearing Noy because that case rightfully “implement[ed] the supreme court’s
constitutional ruling in Ravin”); Order, State v. Noy, Supreme Court No. S-11297
(Sept. 7, 2004); State v. Crocker, 97 P.3d 93, 95 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (“Not all
marijuana possession is a crime in Alaska.”); State v. McNeil, No. 1KE-93-947
CR, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 1993) (rejecting application of section
11.71.060 of the Alaska Statutes that criminalized all possession of marijuana);
see also, Fraternal Order of Eagles v. City & Borough of Juneau, 254 P.3d 348, 357
(Alaska 2011) (finding that a local smoking ordinance that prohibited smoking
cigarettes in private clubs that offered food and alcohol for sale did not run afoul
of the right to privacy as interpreted in Ravin “because [a private club] is not a
home.”).
219. Orlansky & Feldman, supra note 27, at 10–11 (“In the balancing analysis
that has become the trademark of Alaska’s constitutional cases, justice
Rabinowitz declared that personal privacy may be restricted by the state only if
the state can meet its substantial burden by demonstrating a legitimate state
interest in proscribing the private use of marijuana.”).
220. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Alaska
1993) (alteration in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
221. State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 367 (Alaska 2009) (setting out
findings asserted by the State supporting the argument to overturn Ravin based
on factual findings and developments).
222. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 590–91 (Alaska 1975).
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in other countries.223 But the court cautioned, “[i]f such a shift were to
occur, then marijuana use could be characterized as a serious health
problem.”224 Yet a mere shift alone will not be sufficient. The Ravin
decision adds another demanding level of inquiry that must be met
before the changed conditions prong of the stare decisis test can be
satisfied: “The state must demonstrate a need based on proof that the
public health or welfare will in fact suffer if the [marijuana] controls are
not applied.”225
Expert opinions continue to vary greatly on whether such a
conclusive link exists.226 In Ravin, the court found the evidence of
potential danger from marijuana use “contradictory and inconclusive”—
not nearly strong enough to outweigh the heightened privacy interests
respected in Alaska.227 A review of the legislative record for the 2006
amendments reveals a similar split.228 Despite the Legislature’s position
that marijuana is more potent and harmful than it was in 1975, there is
hardly a scientific consensus as to whether marijuana poses significant
danger to the user or others.229 Yet this is precisely what must be proven

223. Id. at 510 n.64.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
226. See Danovitch, supra note 132, at 92 (“Data on marijuana related arrests
and incarceration is inconsistent, but many experts suggest that the adverse
consequences of criminal sanctions are greater than the adverse consequences of
marijuana.”).
227. Orlansky & Feldman, supra note 27, at 11.
228. In March, April, and May 2005, the Alaska Senate and House of
Representatives held a number of public hearings and received documentary
and testimonial evidence from proponents and opponents of marijuana
decriminalization. See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text (summarizing
legislative testimony regarding the 2006 amendments).
229. The Alaska legislature itself is inconsistent on this point. Marijuana is
still classified as a Schedule VIA drug in Alaska, a substance with “the lowest
danger or probable danger to a person or the public.” Compare ALASKA STAT. §
11.71.190 (a), (b) (2012), with § 11.71.160 (a), (f) (placing some marijuana
compounds such as hashish and hashish oil in schedule IIIA with more
dangerous substances). Despite the alleged dangers posed by the more potent
modern forms of marijuana available, the Legislature did not reschedule
marijuana when it amended the criminal penalties for marijuana use in 2006.
Since the justification for recriminalizing all marijuana use was due to the
increased dangers posed by marijuana use, rescheduling the drug at that time
would have been logical. Similarly, the Legislature has made no effort to amend
the constitution to prohibit personal marijuana use and possession. Given the
unsuccessful ballot initiatives aimed at decriminalizing marijuana in 2000 and
2004, the possibility that such an amendment would ultimately pass cannot be
dismissed. However, recent polling indicates that voters nationwide favor
legalizing and regulating marijuana. 56% Favor Legalizing, Regulating Marijuana,
RASMUSSEN REPORTS (May 17, 2012), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/
public_content/lifestyle/general_lifestyle/may_2012/56_favor_legalizing_regul
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to overturn Ravin. Conversely, to uphold the decision, the court does not
need to find that marijuana is less harmful than it was in 1975, or that it
is even exactly the same as it was in 1975. Marijuana may be more
potent now, and may involve other concerns that were not present in
1975, but those facts alone will not automatically justify a blanket
marijuana prohibition that extends to restrict an adult’s private choices
in the home. Respect for the Ravin precedent means the ruling must
stand unless there is proof that permitting adults to use small amounts
of marijuana in the privacy of their homes creates a significant risk to
public health and welfare.230
To date, the “increased potency” theory for overturning Ravin has
not been well received. Three times in the very recent past the Alaska
Supreme Court has declined the chance to revisit Ravin, even when
presented with new research purporting to show the increased health
effects of marijuana.231 As Judge Volland wrote in State v. Mahle:
[I]f there ever was an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
reconsider its holding in Ravin, it was when faced with the
State’s Petition [for Hearing in Noy]. Yet when presented with
the most recent information the State has compiled regarding
marijuana, and a direct opportunity to revisit Ravin v. State, the
Alaska Supreme Court declined to do so.232
Courts typically only reconsider past precedents in light of
significantly changed social conditions, shifting values, better-informed
legal analysis, or a combination thereof. These factors take on greater
significance when the precedent at issue has been weakened by
subsequent decisions.233 This is not the case with Ravin, however, as no
ating_marijuana (finding that 56% of voters nationwide favor legalizing and
regulating marijuana similar to the way alcohol and tobacco cigarettes are
currently regulated).
230. See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511 (“The state must demonstrate a need based on
proof that the public health or welfare will in fact suffer if the controls are not
applied.”).
231. Order, State v. Noy, Supreme Court No. S-11297 (Sept. 7, 2004); Order,
State v. Crocker, Supreme Court No. S-11651 (Dec. 30, 2004); State v. ACLU of
Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 373–74 (Alaska 2009) (relying on the supremacy of the CSA
and the risk of federal prosecution to justify its decision to abstain from ruling
on the merits of the parties’ claims).
232. Order Denying Ravin Hearing at 2, State v. Mahle, Case No. 3AN-S008212 CR, at 1 (Mar. 29, 2006).
233. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), overruling Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (overturning the “separate but equal” doctrine). In
all of the cases that involved the “separate but equal” doctrine in the field of
public graduate education after Plessy but prior to Brown, “inequality was found
in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro
students of the same educational qualifications.” Id. at 492 (citing Missouri ex
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subsequent cases have weakened its holding.234 The continuing vitality
of Ravin thus turns on the degree to which accepted views on the public
health and social effects of marijuana have changed.
The second prong of the stare decisis test, analyzing whether more
good than harm would result from a departure from precedent, is also
tied to changes in marijuana potency and usage patterns. As with Ravin
itself, this question rests on a balance between privacy and public
welfare, and if the scientific evidence is not convincing enough to satisfy
the first prong of the test, then by definition the second prong cannot be
met either.
The second prong also requires the court to “balance the benefits of
adopting a new rule against the benefits of stare decisis: providing
guidance for the conduct of individuals, creating efficiency in litigation
by avoiding the relitigation of decided issues, and maintaining public
faith in the judiciary.”235 As the United States Supreme Court explained
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,236 where it

rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Ok.
St. Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950)) The Court was on its way
toward overturning Plessy when it considered Brown.See also Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 176, 559 (1986)
(noting that “[t]he 25 States with laws prohibiting the conduct referenced in
Bowers [were] reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against
homosexual conduct.”).
234. See, e.g., Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257, 260 (Alaska 2000) (“We have not
overruled Ravin.”); Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1135
(Alaska 1989) (the “fundamental right” of privacy protects the personal use of
marijuana by adults in the home) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Ravin, 537 P.2d at 502); Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 544 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003)
(invalidating a statute that purported to criminalize any and all marijuana
possession); Noy II, 83 P.3d 545, 549 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (declining to rehear
Noy because that case rightfully “implement[ed] the supreme court’s
constitutional ruling in Ravin”); Order, State v. Noy, Supreme Court No. S-11297
(Sept. 7, 2004); Crocker, 97 P.3d at 95 (“Not all marijuana possession is a crime in
Alaska.”); Order, State v. Crocker, Supreme Court No. S-11651 (Dec. 30, 2004);
State v. McNeil, No. 1KE-93-947 CR, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 1993).
(rejecting application of section 11.71.060 of the Alaska Statutes that criminalized
all possession of marijuana); see also, Fraternal Order of Eagles v. City & Borough
of Juneau, 254 P.3d 348, 357 (Alaska 2011) (finding that a local smoking
ordinance that prohibited smoking cigarettes in private clubs that offered food
and alcohol for sale did not run afoul of the right to privacy as interpreted in
Ravin “because [a private club] is not a home.”).
235. State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 761–62 (Alaska 2011); see also Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 853 (1992) (“The reservations any of
us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe [v. Wade] are outweighed
by the explication of individual liberty we have given combined with the force
of stare decisis”).
236. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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was asked to consider overruling its landmark decision in Roe v. Wade:237
[W]hatever the premises of opposition may be, only the most
convincing justification under accepted standards of precedent
could suffice to demonstrate that a later decision overruling the
first was anything but a surrender to political pressure, and an
unjustified repudiation of the principle on which the Court
staked its authority in the first instance. So to overrule under
fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine
a watershed decision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy
beyond any serious question.238
The historical value of Ravin is certainly a factor the court must
consider. Ravin was the watershed decision in Alaska privacy rights
jurisprudence. It established the cornerstone principle that the Alaska
Constitution provides greater protection for individual privacy than the
U.S. Constitution.239 This is not to say that Ravin should be upheld
simply because of its place in history—that is antithetical to the stare
decisis analysis. But given its prominence, the court should be very
cautious when considering deviating from such an entrenched holding.

III. ADMINISTERING AND IMPLEMENTING RAVIN
The current legal landscape in Alaska insulates Ravin from being
easily overturned, but issues related to Ravin are still present.
Implementing the decision remains subject to legislative oversight and
requires continued judicial guidance. This Part explains that a full and
objective review of the health and social effects of marijuana use should
occur outside of the political arena. The Alaska courts should not blindly
defer to legislative findings on this matter. However, the Legislature still
plays an important role in regulating marijuana use by adults in the
privacy of their homes. For instance, the four-ounce personal use ceiling
is not a constitutional imperative. It was a legislative determination and
the Alaska Legislature retains the ability to further define the contours
of personal marijuana use in the home. Additionally, the ability of state
law enforcement officers to investigate activity that falls outside the
scope of Ravin continues to evolve, particularly with respect to search
warrants involving the perception of marijuana odor. The smell of
marijuana alone will not establish probable cause to search a home, but
237. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declaring Texas criminal statutes prohibiting
abortions at any stage of pregnancy except to save the life of the mother are
unconstitutional).
238. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867.
239. See supra Part I.1.
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the courts have yet to determine the precise weight to accord data on the
correlation between marijuana odor and the quantity of marijuana
present within a residence.
A.

The Alaska Legislature Can Determine What Constitutes A Small
Amount of Marijuana

The Alaska Constitution does not confer a fundamental right to
smoke marijuana.240 Rather, Alaskans “have a heightened expectation of
privacy with respect to their personal activities within their home,”
which encompasses the ability to possess marijuana for personal use.241
That expectation of privacy is not absolute—it just limits the extent to
which the State can regulate private conduct in the home. The source of
that expectation, the Alaska Constitution’s privacy clause, directly
grants the Legislature the power to “implement” the right of privacy.242
If the Legislature is going to regulate on a far end of the spectrum and
ban all marijuana use, including use by adults in the home, it must meet
a very demanding standard. However, if it is simply applying Ravin and
attempting to define the contours of personal marijuana use, the
standard is much more lenient. In Walker v. State,243 the Alaska Court of
Appeals recognized that “the legislature . . . has the power to set
reasonable limits on the amount of marijuana that people can possess for
personal use in their homes.”244 This includes determining the quantity
of marijuana that is indicative of commercial activity and prohibiting the
corresponding possession of such an amount. 245
Even though what constitutes a “reasonable” limit on personal
marijuana use does not have a precise judicial definition, so long as
Ravin retains its vitality, the legislature cannot ban all personal
marijuana possession—it cannot set a bright-line limit at “none.” There
240. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 502 (Alaska 1975) (“Few would believe
they have been deprived of something of critical importance if deprived of
marijuana.”).
241. Walker v. State, 991 P.2d 799, 801 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
242. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22.
243. 991 P.2d 799 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
244. Id. at 802.
245. See id. at 803 (“The Ravin decision itself does not elaborate on what
amount of marijuana might constitute an ‘amount . . . indicative of intent to sell.’
That is, the court did not specify the dividing line where, because of the amount
of marijuana involved, the legislature can reasonably regulate personal
possession of marijuana in the home, even in the absence of an intent to sell. We
need not establish a precise dividing line either.”); Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538,
542–43 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (noting Ravin’s acknowledgement that the
legislature could prohibit amounts indicative of an intent to sell rather than
possession for personal use).
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must be some allowance for personal marijuana possession in the home
by adults. This principle is borne out by several cases in which Alaska
appellate courts have upheld legislatively-imposed restrictions on
private marijuana possession that fell short of an outright ban. In Brown
v. State,246 the Alaska Supreme Court confirmed that Ravin offered no
constitutional protection against the buying or selling of marijuana and
that the legislature could make such activity a crime.247 In Garhart v.
State,248 the court further held that this was true even if the purchaser
intended to take the marijuana home and use it for personal purposes.249
In Walker v. State,250 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that a statute that
prohibited all possession of eight ounces or more of marijuana was
constitutional, as that amount was indicative of intent to sell.251 In Noy,
the Court of Appeals struck down a blanket marijuana prohibition, but
upheld the Legislature’s previous determination that possession of four
ounces or more of marijuana could be prohibited because that amount
was presumptively indicative of commercial use.252 In Hotrum v. State,253
the court of appeals determined that the Legislature could prohibit
possession of 25 or more marijuana plants, regardless of their size or
weight.254
These decisions respect the Legislature’s role in implementing the
right of privacy and are consistent with the notion that the courts must
pay deference to the decision of a co-equal branch of government.255
246. 565 P.2d 179 (Alaska 1977).
247. Id. at 180 (quoting Ravin’s assertion that the Alaska constitution does not
protect an individual’s right to sell or distribute marijuana).
248. 147 P.3d 746 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
249. Id. at 751 (rejecting the argument that the Alaska constitution protects
the cooperative growing and distribution of marijuana if the marijuana is
intended solely for the personal use of the people involved in the growing and
distribution activities under Ravin).
250. 991 P.2d 799 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
251. Id. at 803 (“eight ounces or more of marijuana is an amount large
enough to fall within the Ravin court’s category of ‘indicative of intent to sell.’”).
252. Noy, 83 P.3d at 543 (“we conclude that the legislature’s four-ounce
dividing line is presumptively constitutional under Ravin.”).
253. 130 P.3d 965 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
254. See id. at 970 (the legislature adopted the reasoning that “[twenty-five]
small [marijuana] plants had the potential of growing into much larger plants,
and therefore” possession could be prohibited.); see also Pease v. State, 27 P.3d
788, 790 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001) (noting that state statutes “prohibit possession of
25 or more plants of the genus cannabis.”).
255. See, e.g., Noy, 83 P.3d at 543 (“We note, moreover, that article I, section
22 [of the Alaska constitution] entrusts the legislature with the duty of
implementing the constitional right of privacy. Given the language of article I,
section 22, and given the deference that we should pay to the decision of a coequal branch of government, we conclude that the legislature’s four-ounce
dividing line is presumptively constitutional under Ravin.”).
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Such respect remains so long as any restrictions imposed by the
Legislature adhere to the spirit of Ravin.
B.

Review Of The Scientific Evidence Underpinning Ravin Should
Occur Before A Neutral Decision-Maker

When it passed the 2006 marijuana prohibition legislation, the
Alaska Legislature adopted one-sided findings that disregarded any
evidence that was inconsistent with its predetermined position that
marijuana use had become a significant public health threat in the time
since Ravin was decided.256 These findings were hardly the result of
scientific consensus. Expert witnesses testified against the legislation
and submitted documentary evidence refuting many, if not all, of the
state’s conclusions.257 This highlights one of the most important aspects
of the Ravin decision: that the courts may be better suited than the
legislature to accurately appraise marijuana’s characteristics. Accurate
appraisal “is vital for ensuring that determinations on marijuana policy
are informed by fact rather than ideology.”258 In Ravin, the district court,
a neutral body without a political agenda, oversaw the initial
presentation of evidence.259 The court conducted a “full evidentiary
hearing concerning the effects of marijuana,” at which “much expert
testimony was presented.”260 The Alaska Supreme Court then
thoroughly reviewed the scientific evidence presented by the parties,
including expert witness testimony on the health and social effects of
marijuana use and numerous books and reports.261
The hearings that took place in the Alaska Legislature prior to the
256. The findings appeared to be predetermined—they were nearly identical
to the proposed findings the Governor submitted prior to any testimony being
heard and consisted of largely the same evidence the state had previously
submitted to the Alaska Supreme Court in support of its petition for hearing in
Noy. Compare S.B. 74 § 2, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2005), and H.B. 96 § 2, 24th
Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2005), with Petition For Hearing at 6, State v. Noy,
Supreme Court No. S-11297 (Jan. 5, 2004).
257. See supra note 136 (summarizing legislative testimony on the 2006
amendments).
258. Danovitch, supra note 132, at 108.
259. See Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524, 528 n.16 (Alaska 1974) (stating that Ravin
had recently been granted petition for review by the Alaska Supreme Court
following a full evidentiary hearing and presentation of expert testimony on the
effects of marijuana at the lower court).
260. Id.
261. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504–10 (Alaska 1975) (summarizing in
detail the expert testimony and written reports and books introduced into
evidence at the district court); see also id. at 504 n.43 (listing a representative
sampling of works examined by the court in addition to testimony from the
district court).
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passage of the 2006 amendments presented the opposite situation. The
legislature conducted the hearings and the testimony occurred in a
highly-politicized environment.262 Senator French complained about the
lack of time available to testify, present evidence, and thoroughly
discuss the Legislature’s findings, given the complex nature of the
scientific evidence at issue.263 The precise setting in which decisions
impacting constitutional law and civil liberties should not be finalized,
as these types of decisions often involve unpopular and politicallysensitive issues. Indeed, there may often be significant political
motivation for a legislature to sacrifice constitutional principles in order
to appease the electorate. Certainly the legislature is not precluded from
considering evidence that impacts constitutional rights. But when laws
impacting constitutional rights are based on legislative fact-finding, it is
incumbent upon the judiciary to engage in a searching review of the
evidence and not blindly defer to the legislature.264 That is why there is
an established standard for judicial review of legislation that implicates
fundamental rights. Though courts will generally defer to the
determinations of the legislature, full deference to legislative factfinding is improper where legislative action concerns a constitutional
right.265
262. See Cockerham, supra note 108, at A1 (describing the political
environment and sense of time pressure surrounding the marijuana bill).
263. See H.B. 149, ALASKA S. CONF. COMM. 24th Leg. (Apr. 12, 2006) (statement
of Senator Hollis French at 6:41:10 PM) (criticizing the time allotted to analyze
and debate the marijuana issues addressed in the bill); see also Testimony of
Doctor Lester Grinspoon, M.D., Associate Professor of Psychiatry at the Harvard
Medical School, supra note 137; Testimony of Dr. Mitch Earleywine, Ph.D.,
Associate Professor of Psychology, University of Southern California, supra note
137 (“I think that if this legislative body is as meticulous and comprehensive in
collecting and assessing the data as these commissions were, it will have a better
chance of arriving at a sound judgment about whether the harmfulness of
marijuana is sufficient to enact such a restrictive bill.”).
264. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997) (holding
Congress has been given the power to “enforce,” not the power to determine
what constitutes a constitutional violation); Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233,
1237 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)) (“It is . . . the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
265. Valley Hosp. Assoc., Inc., v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 972
(Alaska 1997); see also State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 4 (Alaska 1978) (holding that
appellate courts may look outside the record “where the validity of legislation
having major social consequences is at stake”); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536
(“When the political branches of the Government act against the background of
a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be
understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its
precedents with the respect due them.”); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 437 (2000) (“Congress may not legislatively supersede our [constitutional]
decisions.”); Cleland v. State, 759 P.2d 553, 557 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (stating
that Ravin was about protecting the sanctity of the home under the privacy
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This practice was evident in Ravin itself. Even though the court
specified that it would not “reassess the scientific evidence in the
manner of a legislature,” it still took a very close look at the evidence
and did not defer to the presumption in favor of public health
measures.266 Typically, “when there is substantial doubt as to the safety
of a given substance or situation for the public health, controls intended
to obviate the danger will usually be up-held.”267 Yet, with respect to the
state’s control of marijuana use in the home, the court held the state to a
much higher standard because of the privacy rights involved.268
In the future, if the Alaska Supreme Court is presented with a ripe
challenge to the continuing vitality of Ravin, the court should make a
similar searching inquiry into the full record and review the evidence
independently before it considers the factors of stare decisis and
determines the continuing vitality of the Ravin decision. The court’s first
step should be to determine whether there is sufficient evidence in the
record developed below to even consider whether or not to overturn
Ravin.269 If the court believes the record is insufficient, it can remand the
matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. Alternatively, the
court could limit the proceedings below by remanding with instructions
for the trial court judge to appoint a discovery master to oversee the
submission of evidence on specific questions relating to the social and
health effects of marijuana.270 The court may also choose to forgo an
evidentiary hearing entirely, especially if there was extensive
documentary evidence submitted in the lower court. In such a case,

clause and not about the use of marijuana).
266. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 505 n.44.
267. Id. at 510.
268. Id. at 511 (“[M]ere scientific doubts will not suffice. The state must
demonstrate a need based on proof that the public health or welfare will in fact
suffer if the controls are not applied.”).
269. For example, in ACLU of Alaska v. State, the court considered scientific
journals, books, testimony, expert declarations, statements of disputed facts, and
numerous expert declarations. No. IJU-06-793 CI, 2006 WL 6457870, at *11–12
(Alaska Super. Ct. July 10, 2006).
270. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 53 (discussing generally the procedural rules
regarding the appointment, powers, and proceedings for masters); Peter v.
Progressive Corp., 986 P.2d 865, 870 (Alaska 1999) (“[A]ppointment of a
discovery master should generally be reserved for cases (1) where the issues are
unusually complex or specialized; (2) where discovery is particularly document
intensive; (3) where resolving discovery disputes will be especially time
consuming; (4) where the parties are particularly contentious or obstructionist;
or (5) where a master will facilitate a more speedy and economical
determination of the case.”); McRae v. State, 909 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1996) (“[T]he appellate courts often remand factual issues to the trial
courts, and the trial courts often appoint masters to make factual determinations
necessary to the courts’ ultimate legal rulings.”).
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where there will be “literally hundreds of scientific articles and
numerous experts . . . it is questionable whether such an expanded
hearing would reveal more reliable or higher quality information than is
available by referring to authorities submitted in briefs by both sides,
and, in appropriate cases, by additional research at the appellate
level.”271
A challenge to the constitutionality of the state’s criminal marijuana
laws would also deal mainly with “legislative facts” as opposed to
“adjudicative facts.”272 Legislative facts do not relate directly to the
happenings in a particular case—to the parties or their actions—but to
more general matters that influence policy decisions, such as social,
political, economic, or scientific knowledge.273 When legislative facts are
at the fore, it may be appropriate for the court to conduct its own
research and consider sources outside the record.274 This would be an
unusual step, but a court may be compelled to do so in order to
adequately understand the background issues at play in cases “where
the validity of legislation having major social consequences is at
stake.”275
C.

Benchmarks for Gauging the State’s Interest in Restricting
Private Marijuana Use

To gauge the state’s interest required to justify restrictions on an
adult’s private activities in the home, it is helpful to review how Alaska
courts have addressed laws that restrict other intoxicating substances.
Indeed, that is precisely what the Ravin court did. The court did not
view the social and health effects of marijuana in a vacuum, but rather
as compared to the harms posed by other substances. The court found
that the “effects of marijuana on the individual are not serious enough to
justify widespread concern, at least as compared with the far more
dangerous effects of alcohol, barbiturates and amphetamines.”276
Tellingly, several years later, Alaska appellate courts would rule that the
state constitution did not protect personal use and possession of cocaine,
alcohol, or tobacco.277

271. State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 6 (Alaska 1978).
272. Erickson, 574 P.2d at 5.
273. Id. at 5–6.
274. See id. at 4–6 (discussing generally the expanded scope of appellate
review beyond the record when legislative facts are at issue).
275. Id. at 4.
276. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 509–10 (Alaska 1975).
277. See Fraternal Order of Eagles v. City and Borough of Juneau, 254 P.3d
348, 358 (Alaska 2011) (holding a city and borough’s ordinance prohibiting
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In State v. Erickson,278 the Alaska Supreme Court applied the Ravin
standard to cocaine use and found that “criminalization of the personal
use and possession of cocaine in the home does not constitute an invalid
infringement on the right to privacy.”279 The Court relied on welldocumented evidence that the nature and effects of cocaine made it
“substantially more of a threat to health and welfare” than marijuana
because “cocaine can cause death as a direct effect of the
pharmacological action of the drug” and “cocaine certainly has some
potential for producing crime and violence.”280 Similarly in Harrison v.
State,281 the Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of Alaska’s
Local Option laws that allow jurisdictions to prohibit the importation of
alcohol.282 The court upheld the local option law at issue because “the
evidence showing the harmful effects of [alcohol] consumption is
undisputed” and “[t]he threat posed to society by widespread alcohol
use is enormous.”283 And more recently, in Fraternal Order of Eagles v.
City and Borough of Juneau,284 the Alaska Supreme Court found a close
and substantial relationship between protecting the public from the
harmful effects of tobacco smoke and banning smoking in a private club
because “[t]he toll of death and injury caused by consumption of
tobacco is not subject to serious dispute.”285
To the courts in Erickson, Harrison, and Fraternal Order of Eagles, the
harm to public health and welfare was well-documented and largely
undisputed. In light of the standard established in Ravin and those
subsequent rulings, the Alaska Supreme Court should not sustain a law
proscribing all marijuana use and possession unless it finds that
marijuana is now as harmful to both individual health and society in
smoking in private clubs did not violate right to privacy under the State
Constitution); Erickson, 574 P.2d at 5; Harrison v. State, 687 P.2d 332, 339 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1984) (holding local option law prohibiting sale and importation of
alcohol did not violate State Constitution where the enactment bore a close and
substantial relationship to the goal of protecting the public health and welfare).
278. 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978).
279. Id. at 23.
280. Id. at 16–18, 21–22.
281. 687 P.2d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
282. See id. at 335 (stating that Harrison is challenging the constitutionality of
Alaska’s local option law). The right to consume alcohol was not directly at
issue; the challenged law did not prohibit the use of alcoholic beverages in the
home. Id. at 338.
283. Id. at 339.
284. 254 P.3d 348 (Alaska 2011).
285. Id. at 358. Although the case did not deal with tobacco use in the home,
in 2011 the Alaska Supreme Court found that the City and Borough of Juneau
had “a legitimate interest in protecting the public, non-smokers and smokers
alike, from the well-established dangers of second-hand tobacco smoke.” Id. at
359.
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ways similar to alcohol, cocaine, or tobacco.286 But determining exactly
how marijuana compares to other substances is complicated; each
carries its own unique harms, both to the user and the public at large.
Application of a method such as multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA),
a holistic approach to measuring the appropriateness or effectiveness of
a system, could simplify this process and provide for a more
quantitative-based comparison between substances.287 Such an approach
is especially useful when analyzing controlled substances because of
“the wide range in ways that drugs can cause harm.”288
Without describing it as such, the courts in Ravin, Erickson, and
Harrison essentially followed a MCDA-like approach by considering a
variety of harm factors related to marijuana, cocaine, and alcohol. In
each of those cases the courts weighed some combination of the
following criteria:














Number of users and rate of consumption among various
populations
Short and long term physical effects on the user
Short and long term psychological effects on the user
Mortality rate due to usage
Level of physical addictiveness
Level of psychological dependency
Potential for abuse
Correlation between use and criminal behavior
Correlation between use and domestic violence and child
abuse
Propensity for use to incite violent, aggressive behavior
Effect on adolescents
Effect on driving an automobile
Economic cost of abuse and addiction289

These criteria were included among those used in a 2010 study by
Nutt, et al., that employed MCDA to assess 20 different substances along
16 different harm criteria, distinguishing between specifically-identified
harms to the user and harms to others.290 That study provides an easyto-follow framework for a court to use to consider the relative harms to

286. See Harrison, 687 P.2d at 338 (stating that the court in Erickson expressly
found that alcohol is a more dangerous drug than both marijuana and cocaine).
287. See Jennifer Kuzma, Pouya Najmaie & Joel Larson, Evaluating Oversight
Systems for Emerging Technologies: A Case Study of Genetically Engineered
Organisms, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 546, 551 (2009) (“MCDA relies on the notion
that no single outcome metric can capture the appropriateness or effectiveness of
a system, allows for integrating heterogeneous information, and enables
incorporation of expert and stakeholder judgments.”).
288. David Nutt et al., Drug Harms in the UK: A Multicriteria Decision Analysis,
376 LANCET 1558, 1558 (2010).
289. Erickson, 574 P.2d at 8–11; Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 506–11 (Alaska
1975); Harrison, 687 P.2d at 335–38.
290. Nutt et al., supra note 288, at 1558.
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both individuals and society from use of any drug.291 And like the
Alaska courts,292 Nutt ultimately found that marijuana was less harmful
overall than alcohol, cocaine, or tobacco, though still not completely
benign.293
A key aspect of the MCDA approach used in the 2010 study was
that it carefully distinguished the harms to the individual user from the
harms to society as a whole. This is particularly relevant with respect to
marijuana regulation in Alaska because of the strong individual privacy
rights at stake. The Ravin court was quite frustrated with the State’s
“assumption that [it] has the authority to protect the individual from his
own folly, that is, that the State can control activities which present no
harm to anyone except those enjoying them.” 294 Notwithstanding the
accuracy of Nutt, et al.’s finding, or its applicability to drug usage
patterns in Alaska, the MCDA approach used yielded a direct
quantitative comparison of drugs based on their harm to users versus
their harm to others, as well as based on their overall weighted scores
for each of the identified harm criteria.295 Such a formalized MCDA
approach would be very useful for the Alaska Supreme Court should it
have occasion to revisit Ravin, or to review restrictions on any other
controlled substance.296 It would allow the court to more accurately
refine the spectrum of drug restrictions under Alaska law.
D.

The Relationship Between Marijuana Odor And Probable Cause
Remains Contested

In State v. Crocker, the Alaska Court of Appeals ruled that the smell
of marijuana alone was not sufficient probable cause to search a home
291. Id. at 1559 fig.1; see id. at 1560 for definitions of the criteria.
292. See, e.g., State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 9 (Alaska 1978) (“Unlike marijuana,
cocaine can cause death as a direct effect of its pharmacological action.”).
293. See Nutt et al., supra note 288, at 1561 fig.2 (assigning alcohol, cocaine,
and tobacco overall harm scores of 72, 27, and 26, respectively while cannabis
received an overall harm score of 20).
294. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 508.
295. Nutt et al., supra note 288, at 1561.
296. For example, the Municipality of Anchorage recently banned synthetic
cannabinoid drugs, commonly known as “K2” or “Spice.” Rosemary Shinohara,
Assembly Outlaws Chemical Known as ‘Synthetic Marijuana,’ ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Dec. 18, 2010, available at http://www.adn.com/2010/12/08/vprinter/1594268/assembly-outlaws-street-chemical.html. Though it is often
referred to as “synthetic marijuana,” these substances do not contain any THC,
the active ingredient in marijuana, but both are considered cannabinoids
because they both attach themselves to the cannabinoid receptors in the brain.
Roland Macher et al., Synthetic Marijuana, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, May
2012,
available
at
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/lawenforcement-bulletin/may-2012/synthetic-marijuana.
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for evidence of illegal marijuana-related activity.297 The court did not
disregard the possibility that there was a correlation between the
strength of marijuana odor and the amount of marijuana giving rise to
that odor, but it would “not simply assume that there is a direct
proportionality” in the absence of any supporting evidence.298 Following
Crocker, Alaska law enforcement officials began making an effort to
document that correlation and to establish that the smell of growing
marijuana outside of a structure is evidence that there is an illegal
amount of marijuana inside the structure. In affidavits submitted in
support of search warrants in several cases, officers have stated that
“just smelling the odor of cultivating marijuana on the outside air is
indicative of a commercial grow operation”299 and that they cannot
smell “personal-use quantities of marijuana in the air outside a residence
because there is not enough plant material to generate the odor.”300 They
have also presented statistical evidence to support this “smell test”
theory: eighty-one of the marijuana grows seized by the Alaska State
Trooper’s Matanuska-Susitna Drug Enforcement Unit (AST Mat-Su
Drug Unit) from 2000 to 2004 were discovered by officers smelling
growing marijuana, and in 96% of those seizures, a “felony level grow
operation was discovered.”301
297. 97 P.3d 93, 96–97; see generally supra notes 95–106 and accompanying text
(discussing Crocker decision).
298. Id. at 97.
299. United States v. Thoms, 788 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1005 (D. Alaska 2011),
vacated on other grounds and remanded, 684 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2012). According to
these affidavits, “the ability to smell the odor of cultivating marijuana outside a
building is, by itself, indicative of a commercial grow operation because it
typically indicates the use of an installed air venting system.” State v. Smith, 182
P.3d 651, 654 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008); see also Cavitt v. State, No. A-10480, 2011
WL 5428968, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2011) (relying in part on testimony
that personal grow operations do not need to vent excessive heat and thus the
odor of growing marijuana is not transferred outside); Nelson v. State, No. A10113, 2009 WL 2092450, at *6 (Alaska Ct. App. July 15, 2009) (considering
trooper’s observation of a vent hole as a factor when determining if the grow
operation was commercial or personal).
300. Rofkar v. State, No. A-10383, 2011 WL 746439, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App.
Mar. 2, 2011), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 273 P.3d 1140 (Alaska 2012).
301. Smith, 182 P.3d at 654; Nelson, 2009 WL 2092450, at *6 (officer reported
smelling strong odor of freshly grown marijuana); Rofkar, 2011 WL 746439, at *1
(relying on affidavits from officer explaining that in the previous four years his
drug unit had eighty-one cases arising from officers smelling the odor of
cultivating marijuana and that of these, ninety-six percent involved felony-level
grow operations); Thoms, 788 F. Supp. 2d. at 1004 (relying on affidavits from
officer who smelled a “strong odor of cultivating marijuana while driving”);
Starkey v. State, 272 P.3d 347, 348 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012) (relying, in addition to
other indicia, on odor of growing marijuana while standing in the yard). A
“felony level grow operation” refers to a grow consisting of more than four
ounces of marijuana or more than 25 plants. ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.040(a)(3)(G)
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Three published opinions have discussed these data. In State v.
Smith,302 the Alaska Court of Appeals found that these statistics, along
with the investigator’s assertion of a “moderate odor” of growing
marijuana coming from inside the structure and information about the
officer’s experience in smelling felony-level marijuana grow operations,
established probable cause because when combined they “linked his
ability to smell marijuana from the driveway of Smith’s property to a
probability that the mobile home contained evidence of a commercial
grow of marijuana.”303 But the defendant challenged the validity of the
statistical analysis, arguing that the statistics cited were “unreliable
because the data consists only of those instances in which the police
ultimately seized the marijuana they smelled” and the data did “not
specify whether and how many times [the investigator’s] unit smelled
cultivating marijuana but did not seize it because the grows were not
commercial grows.”304 The Court of Appeals did not address the
validity of the data, but did note that at trial the defendant had not had a
formal opportunity to review the data or to determine the extent to
which the data influenced the magistrate’s decision to issue the
warrant.305 The court remanded the case in order to give the defendant
an opportunity to discover if there were flaws in the statistical analysis
or misstatements that would undercut the finding of probable cause.306
The subsequent proceedings did not produce any reported findings on
the quality of that statistical analysis.307
The same analysis was debated three years later in United States v.
Thoms.308 In that case the data was presented as a study that purported
to prove that “96% of the time, when an officer smells marijuana on the
outside air, there is more than four ounces of marijuana present.”309 The
court was not convinced by this evidence and found the study
“statistically flawed.”310 One year later, in Starkey v. State,311 the Court of
(2012).
302. 182 P.3d 651 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).
303. Id. at 652–54.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 655.
306. Id.
307. State v. Fucci, No. A-9863, 2008 WL 5025423, at *1–2 (Alaska Ct. App.
Nov. 26, 2008).
308. 788 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1015 (D. Alaska 2011) vacated on other grounds and
remanded, 684 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2012).
309. Id. at 1005.
310. Id. The study was ultimately irrelevant to the outcome as the court
identified numerous other problems with the facts upon which the search
warrants were based. See id. at 1005–16. For example, the court expressed
disbelief as to whether the officer could have smelled marijuana at all under the
circumstances: “[Investigator] Young claimed to smell a strong odor of
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Appeals held that these statistics were not “scientific” evidence subject
to the Coons/Daubert standard for evaluating the admissibility of
scientific evidence.312 The statistical analysis was viewed as “a report or
summary of information accumulated by the Mat–Su drug unit through
actual experience” and “rested on fairly straightforward mathematics—
and some implicit or unarticulated assumptions about the facts of the 81
underlying cases.”313 This determination did not weigh on the ultimate
outcome of the case. The court found that there was probable cause to
believe Starkey was using his residence to grow marijuana in criminal
quantities even without considering the statistical analysis.314
It remains to be seen how much weight an Alaska court would
place on such data if a scientifically and statistically valid study on
marijuana odor was submitted as the only evidence in support of a
search warrant application. In Smith the Court of Appeals found that the
study helped cure the search warrant deficiencies that were present in
Crocker, but the court ultimately remanded the case so the defendant
could review (and potentially challenge) the accuracy of the data and
determine the extent to which the issuing magistrate relied on it.315
There is no other indication in the line of post-Crocker cases that
statistical information alone would establish probable cause in this
context. Rather, courts have been willing to accept the State’s data as
part of the overall picture of probable cause regarding unlawful
marijuana activity in the home—so long as additional factors evincing
marijuana possession that exceeds the scope of what is protected under
Ravin (none of which would necessarily establish probable cause on
their own) are also present.316
marijuana that could have only emanated from an enclosed building
approximately 450 feet away. The building was equipped with a carbon
filtration system. There was a two-story residence atop a hill and substantial
vegetation obstructing the only possible source of odor. Young was in a moving
vehicle with his driver’s side window partially down in February.” Id. at 1007.
311. 272 P.3d 347 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012).
312. Id. at 353.
313. Id.
314. Id. (“even if this statistical analysis . . . were removed . . . the application
would still provide probable cause for the search warrant.”); see also id. at 354
(finding probable cause where (1) authorities received a tip from a confidential
informant about a large number of marijuana plants growing in Starkey’s
residence; (2) officers smelled growing marijuana at the residence; (3) officers
heard noise from inside the house indicating the presence of electrical ballasts
and/or ventilating fans; (4) the house was using an unusual amount of
electricity; (5) a large number of buckets of the type used by marijuana growers
were present; and (6) a 30-pound bag of growing medium was found).
315. State v. Smith, 182 P.3d 651, 654 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).
316. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, No. A-10113, 2009 WL 2092450, *6 (Alaska Ct.
App. July 15, 2009) (upholding search where officer smelled marijuana odor in
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A recent report lends credence to the decision to consider
marijuana odor as but one of many markers a judicial officer may
consider when reviewing the “totality of circumstances” surrounding a
search warrant application.317 In 2011 the Alaska State Troopers
commissioned a more thorough and detailed review of its data on
searches and the smell of marijuana on the open air.318 The report
concluded that there is a positive correlation between the strength of
marijuana odor emanating from a residence and the presence of large
quantities (defined in the study as four or more ounces or 25 or more
plants) of marijuana contained therein.319 In other words, based on these
data, the detection of the odor of growing marijuana increased the
likelihood that relatively large quantities of marijuana would be
discovered. However, the report also found that the so-called “smell
test” was a “suboptimal” means for detecting illegal quantities of
marijuana.320 The “smell test” has a significant risk of producing false
positives (conducting searches based on smell when large quantities are
not present) and a high rate of false negatives (discovering large
quantities of marijuana in the absence of odor detection).321 The report
also cautioned that the “smell test” alone cannot be relied upon to
accurately determine the precise amount of marijuana present within a
structure.322

addition to seeing a grow-light system, heard an electric humming consistent
with electrical ballasts and fans, and excessive electricity usage). Other factors
courts have considered include: a strong odor of marijuana during the nighttime
(suggesting the type of venting that is involved with larger-scale marijuana
grow operations), heavy foot traffic in and out of the residence, high use of
electricity, evidence that the occupant of the residence was unemployed but had
made several large purchases. See Rofkar v. State, No. A-10383, 2011 WL 746439,
at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2011), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 273
P.3d 1140 (Alaska 2012) (considering higher than normal electrical usage despite
house being uninhabited as one indicia of a commercial grow operation).
317. Burrece v. State, 976 P.2d 241, 243 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (stating that
the test is flexible and considers the totality of circumstances).
318. See generally BRAD A. MYSTROL & JASON BRANDEIS, THE PREDICTIVE
VALIDITY OF MARIJUANA ODOR DETECTION: AN EXAMINATION OF ALASKA STATE
TROOPER
CASE
REPORTS
2006–2010
(2012),
available
at
justice.uaa.alaska.edu/research/2010/1110.02.ast.marijuana/1110.02.marijuana.
pdf.
319. Id. at 51–52.
320. Id. at 41.
321. See id. at 41–42 (finding the false positive rate for the smell test to be
51.5% and the false negative rate to be 83.1%).
322. Id. at 51–52. The study identified several other limitations. First, the
scope of the study was limited to the marijuana grow searches conducted by
AST investigators from 2006–2010. Id. at 52. Inferences to other jurisdictions,
different time periods, or another sampling universe cannot be made from these
data. Id. Second, this was not a study of searches conducted solely because
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IV: RAVIN CONTINUES TO PEACEFULLY COEXIST WITH
THE CSA
Many wonder about the relationship between Ravin and the federal
Controlled Substances Act (CSA). This is not surprising considering the
contrast between Ravin and the CSA has always been stark: personal use
and possession of any amount of marijuana were illegal under the CSA
when Ravin was decided and remain so today.323 Despite what appears
at first blush to be a significant conflict—a federal law that conflicts with
a state law will generally preempt the state law and render it “without
effect”324—the right to personal use of marijuana created by Ravin is not

investigators smelled marijuana. It was a study of the overall searches
conducted, which included situations where officers smelled marijuana during
those searches. This is important because the factors that gave rise to the search
in the first place—other than marijuana odor—were always present in addition
to the marijuana odor. Next, the source of the data for this study was archival—
it consisted of 333 case records written and submitted by AST investigators. Id.
Any information not recorded, or ambiguities in the case reports, could not be
clarified and were not included in the study. Id. at 52–53. Finally, the study was
not inclusive of all factors that could influence search outcomes. For instance, the
study did not account for attributes of the officers themselves, such as training
and experience, or prior criminal history of suspected offenders. Id. at 53. In
short, these findings are specific to a unique set of facts (a snapshot of a certain
time and place) and should not be generalized to include all situations where
law enforcement officers might smell marijuana.
323. See The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2012) (“CSA”).
The CSA contains a limited exception for marijuana possession for governmentapproved and registered scientific research. §§ 822, 823. Federal marijuana
crimes carry maximum prison sentences ranging from one year to life in prison
and maximum fines ranging from one thousand dollars to eight million dollars,
depending upon the amount of marijuana involved and the circumstances
surrounding the conviction. §§ 841(b), 844(a).
324. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). There is also a
strong presumption against federal preemption of state laws in areas
traditionally regulated by the states, such as the police power. Burts v. Burts, 266
P.3d 337, 343 (Alaska 2011) (courts “start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the State were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”); Allen v. State, Dep’t of
Health & Soc. Servs., 203 P.3d 1155, 1160 (Alaska 2009) (“There is a presumption
against federal preemption of state law. . . .”); Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235,
1245 (Alaska 1977) (“There can be no question of the authority of the State in the
exercise of its police power to regulate the administration, sale, prescription and
use of dangerous and habit-forming drugs. . . .”); Belgarde v. State, 543 P.2d 206,
208 (Alaska 1975) (holding that a state prohibition on possession of marijuana in
the home is a valid exercise of the state’s police power for the public welfare);
State v. Dupier, 118 P.3d 1039, 1049 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also Native Vill. of Eklutna v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 87 P.3d
41, 56 (Alaska 2004) (“In determining the scope of federal preemption, we start
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
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preempted by the CSA and is consistent with longstanding notions of
state sovereignty.325
Two overarching principles of federalism frame the relationship
between Ravin and the CSA. First, states are never preempted from
decriminalizing an activity just because it is prohibited by federal law.
States have the sovereign right to determine the extent to which they
will punish or not punish certain types of conduct. Second, it is well
established that state constitutions can provide greater protection for
individual rights than the United States Constitution.326 Ravin, which
decriminalized a very thin slice of marijuana possession under the
Alaska Constitution’s more robust right to privacy, fits squarely within
this framework—so squarely that the opinion did not even mention
preemption or the CSA.327 The federal preemption doctrine is simply not
implicated by Ravin. Indeed, following Ravin, state courts have adhered
to that view, never issuing an opinion on federal preemption of Alaska’s
personal-use marijuana laws.328 As far as the courts are concerned, Ravin
Congress.”) (internal quotations omitted).
325. This Section discusses marijuana possession in Alaska as permitted by
Ravin and the right to privacy only, and not use permitted by Alaska’s medical
marijuana law. ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.37.010–17.37.080 (2012). For a discussion on
the applicability of the CSA to state medical marijuana laws, see D. Douglas
Metcalf, Federal Supremacy and Arizona’s Medical Marijuana Act, 47 ARIZ. ATT’Y 22,
23 (2011) (“Arizona’s new Medical Marijuana Act, which legalizes the
distribution and use of marijuana for medical use in certain situations, has no
bearing on whether such activities remain illegal under federal law.”); M.
Wesley Clark, Can State “Medical” Marijuana Statutes Survive the Sovereign’s
Federal Drug Laws? A Toke Too Far, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 8 (2005) (“It is clear that
Congress views any state drug legalization attempts to be in conflict with and
preempted by the CSA.”).
326. Stephen McAllister, Individual Rights Under a System of Dual Sovereignty:
The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 8, 71 (2011); See also Oregon v.
Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (“[A] State is free as a matter of its own law to
impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be
necessary upon federal constitutional standards.”); Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (discussing a “State’s power to impose higher standards on
searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to
do so”); State v. Batts, 195 P.3d 144, 152 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he Alaska
Constitution’s privilege against self-incrimination has been interpreted to
impose greater restrictions on the government than the federal Fifth
Amendment.”).
327. See generally Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
328. There are only two reported Alaska decisions where the CSA has even
come up. In Brown v. Ely, the Court held that a violation of the right to possess
marijuana under state law could not form the basis of a federal civil rights claim
because the activity was prohibited by federal law “regardless of whether
Alaska law provides additional protections.” 14 P.3d 257, 261 (Alaska 2000). See
generally State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364 (Alaska 2009) (relying on the
supremacy of the CSA and the risk of federal prosecution to justify its decision
to abstain from ruling on the merits of the parties’ claims). Federal courts also
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and the CSA can peacefully coexist. A closer look at state sovereignty
and the Tenth Amendment bears out why this is so.
States are not obligated to regulate and penalize drug use at all, but
they can, and do, craft laws consistent with their own “social norms and
personal preferences.”329 The Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering
rule precludes the federal government from forcing states to pass
coexistent, or even complimentary, controlled substance laws, or from
forcing states to enforce federal drug laws.330 These states’ rights are
very clear in Alaska, where the state and the federal government diverge
significantly in how they view the hazards of marijuana use and how
they choose to punish it. Alaska has historically rated marijuana offenses
as among the least serious of all drug offenses and continues to classify
it as a Schedule VIA substance—a drug with the lowest degree of
danger to a person or the public.331 Conversely, under the CSA
marijuana is listed as a Schedule I controlled substance because it has “a
high potential for abuse,” “no currently accepted medical use in
treatment,” and “a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other
substance under medical supervision.”332
Penalties for simple
possession under state law are also lower than under federal law.333
Finally, of course, there is Ravin, which prohibits the State of Alaska

appear to be silent on the issue of preemption with regard to Ravin.
329. Alex Kreit, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug Laws in
an Age of State Reforms, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 555, 571 (2010).
330. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution
has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the
States to govern according to Congress’ instructions”); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot compel states to enact or
enforce a federal regulatory program); Robert A. Mikos, On The Limits Of
Supremacy: Medical Marijuana And The States’ Overlooked Power To Legalize Federal
Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1446 (2009) (“The preemption power is constrained
by the Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering rule. That rule stipulates that
Congress may not command state legislatures to enact laws nor order state
officials to administer them.”). State officials and local police officers may,
however, enforce federal drug laws on their own volition. Gonzales v. City of
Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that concurrent enforcement
activity is authorized where state enforcement does not impair federal
regulatory interests).
331. Waters v. State, 483 P.2d 199, 201 (Alaska 1971) (finding an absence of
foundation for characterization of marijuana offender as the worst type of drug
offender for sentencing purposes); ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.190(a), (b) (2012).
332. 21 U.S.C. § 812, (b)(1)(A)–(C), (c) (2012).
333. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.040 (2012) (making simple possession of
four ounces or more a Class C Felony), and § 12.55.125(e) (limiting punishment
for a Class C Felony to five years), with 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2012) (providing for
penalties of life in prison and fines of eight million dollars depending upon the
amount of marijuana involved and the circumstances surrounding the
conviction.
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from penalizing adults who possess a small amount of marijuana in
their homes for personal use, a protection that does not exist under
federal law. However, application of the CSA in Alaska is actually
consistent with Ravin: federal prosecutors are not concerned with
possession of small amounts of marijuana in private residences.334 The
risk of federal prosecution for conduct protected by Ravin is therefore
extremely low.335
The existence of different state and federal rubrics for regulating
and punishing (or not punishing) marijuana-related activity is not
unusual or problematic. In approximately sixteen states (as well as a
number of municipalities), simple possession of a small amount of
marijuana leaves one subject to, at most, a minor civil fine,336 whereas

334. The Criminal Division of the United States Attorney’s Office for the
District of Alaska does not include simple marijuana possession among its
prosecutorial priorities. See State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 377 n.19
(Alaska 2009) (enumerating ten priorities: (1) protecting the United States from
terrorist attack; (2) protecting this country from foreign intelligence operations
and espionage; (3) protecting this country from cyber-based attacks and hightechnology crimes; (4) combating public corruption; (5) protecting civil rights; (6)
combating transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises; (7)
combating major white-collar crime; (8) combating significant violent crime; (9)
supporting federal, state, local, and international partners; and (10) upgrading
technology to succeed in the FBI mission); Criminal, THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, DISTRICT OF ALASKA, http://www.justice.gov/usao
/ak/criminal.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). The Division prosecutes mainly
felony offenses and its misdemeanor docket consists of “cases involving more
minor offense[s] and violations occurring in Alaska’s many amazing federal
parks, national forests and federal lands.” ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 377 n.19.
This would exclude prosecution of adults who possessed small amounts of
marijuana in their homes for personal use; simple possession of marijuana is a
misdemeanor under the CSA. State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 377 n.19
(“Prosecutions of persons in their homes for misdemeanor marijuana possession
would appear not to fall within the described activities.”).
335. In his dissent in State v. ACLU of Alaska, Justice Carpeneti noted that “the
United States brought zero misdemeanor drug possession cases in Alaska in
fiscal year 2005 and less than ten cases each year in fiscal year 2006 and fiscal
year 2007.” 204 P.3d at 376–77 (Carpeneti, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
336. Fourteen states (Alaska, California, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, and Rhode Island) have decriminalized recreational marijuana use. See
Places that Have Decriminalized Non-Medical Cannabis in the United States,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Places_that_have_decriminalized_
non-medical_cannabis_in_the_United_States (last modified Nov. 20, 2012);
Jennifer R. Donnelly, Commentary, The Need for Ibogaine in Drug and Alcohol
Addiction Treatment, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 93, 112 (2011) (identifying twelve states
that have decriminalized marijuana). Two other states, Colorado and
Washington, have legalized such activity. Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws
in 2 States, but Legal Questions Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at P15, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/ politics/marijuana-laws-eased-incolorado-and-washington.html.
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federal law allows for a prison term for the same offense.337 There are
many other examples of state laws that permit conduct proscribed by
the federal government.338 These laws may not be perfectly in sync with
federal law, but neither are they preempted solely because of their more
restrictive federal counterparts. To find otherwise would upend the
Tenth Amendment by nullifying sovereign state decisions that are
inconsistent with federal objectives. It would be a backdoor way of
forcing states to enact laws that mimicked federal statutes.
Alaska’s personal use marijuana law was created through
independent judicial interpretation of the Alaska Constitution’s right to
privacy. The State of Alaska, whether via its legislative, executive, or
judicial branch, is not required to march in lockstep with federal drug
policy. Ravin and the CSA continue to peacefully coexist: Ravin merely
limits the ability of the State of Alaska to criminalize certain marijuanarelated conduct that occurs within the privacy of the home. It does
nothing to impact federal enforcement of the CSA on Alaskan soil.339 It
does not abrogate the ability of federal officials to enforce the CSA, nor
does it shield Alaskans from federal criminal charges.340

337. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2012).
338. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S 241, 290 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that
“countless . . . federal criminal provisions . . . [prohibit] conduct that happens to
not be forbidden under state law”); see also Hyland v. Fukuda, 580 F.2d 977, 980–
81 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that Hawaii law exempting state employees from
Hawaii law prohibiting possession of a firearm by certain felons was not
preempted by federal law with no such exemption); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3127.1 (2012) (exempting from state criminal prohibition the possession of a
controlled substance by an individual who needs medical assistance due to a
drug overdose, as well as by an individual who seeks medical assistance for a
person experiencing an overdose); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302A (2012) (not
criminalizing the purchase of handguns to individuals ages eighteen through
twenty-one even though federal law proscribes handgun purchases for
individuals aged eighteen through twenty-one, 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) (2012); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-14-110(a) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-90a(a) (2012); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11 § 1112A(a)(3) (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 259 (2012); MO.
REV. STAT. § 21.750(2) (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-320.02 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-202.3 (2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.06 (a)(2) (West 2012); WIS. STAT. §
948.075 (2012).
339. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 370 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the supremacy of the federal drug laws over state medical marijuana
laws in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005)); Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257, 260–
61 (Alaska 2000) (holding that additional protections under state law are
subordinate to federal law where the right protected by state law is expressly
prohibited by federal law).
340. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375 (“The elements of, and the defenses
to, a federal cause of action are defined by federal law.”). However, Ravin could
be seen as fostering uncooperative behavior with federal drug policy: that
“roughly 99% of all marijuana arrests are made by state and local officials”
indicates that “federal anti-drug policy is meant to be a joint undertaking

BRANDEIS_V8.0 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012

12/9/2012 7:20 PM

CONTINUING VITALITY OF RAVIN V. STATE

235

CONCLUSION
The debate over the legality of marijuana in Alaska continues, and
Ravin v. State remains at its center. During the past thirty-seven years,
the Alaska Legislature has partially embraced (in 1975), fully embraced
(in 1982), and then completely rejected (in 2006), Ravin’s core holding.
Voters of the state have been similarly inconsistent, choosing to
recriminalize all marijuana possession (in 1990), then to decriminalize
possession for medical use (in 1998), then to reject further
decriminalization efforts (in 2000 and 2004). The courts, however, have
remained steadfast, never veering from the landmark precedent
established in 1975. This is not surprising. Political winds shift and the
opinions of voters change, but stare decisis, a court’s duty to abide by and
adhere to prior decisions, remains the backbone of our legal system.
It is against that backdrop that Ravin retains its vitality. No
subsequent Alaska Supreme Court decision has weakened its holding,
nor indicated that the court would overrule itself. Rather, a number of
trial courts, the Alaska Court of Appeals, and the Alaska Supreme Court
have consistently affirmed Ravin’s interpretation of the Alaska
Constitution’s right to privacy: that the interest of the State of Alaska in
regulating the personal use of marijuana in the home by adults was not
sufficient to overcome the fundamental right to privacy.
Ravin and its progeny remain intact as the controlling precedents in
the state. Accordingly, Alaskans can currently lawfully possess up to
four ounces of marijuana in their homes for personal use, but still risk
prosecution under existing state and federal statutes. Though that risk is
mitigated by the policies currently employed by both the Alaska
Department of Law and the United States Department of Justice: the
state has a policy in place against prosecuting conduct that falls within
the scope of Ravin and small, non-commercial marijuana cases are not a
priority for the federal government.
If the state does shift course and begins enforcing the new statutes,
stare decisis commands that any state trial court that considers the
statutes is bound to declare them unconstitutional and unenforceable to
the extent they conflict with Ravin. Should the Alaska Supreme Court
have occasion to revisit Ravin, there is a very high threshold that must
be met before the Court could overturn the ruling, even in light of

between federal and state officials . . . . Hence, states that have legalized
marijuana are acting uncooperatively in what is supposed to be a cooperative
task, i.e., the enforcement of marijuana laws in violation of federal law.” Berkley,
supra note 60, at 436–37 (quoting Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken,
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1283–84 (2009)).
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current marijuana potency and usage patterns; there must be clear
scientific proof that public health and welfare will in fact suffer if private
marijuana use by adults is not prohibited. Unless and until that is
proven to the Alaska Supreme Court, Ravin retains its vitality and
Alaskans can continue to maintain a high level of privacy in their
homes.

